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I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1331, Title 28 of the United States Code is the general
federal question jurisdictional statute, which grants federal district
courts with original subject matter jurisdiction over "all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."'
This statute grounds the majority of civil actions heard in federal
court. 2 Given the weighty doctrinal 3 and pragmatic4 consequences that

1.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
2.
From March 2005 to March 2006, 244,068 civil cases were filed in the federal courts. Of
these, 47,298 cases took subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of the United States being a party.
Of the cases not involving the federal government, 134,582 were filed as federal question cases
while only 62,188 took jurisdiction due to the diversity of the parties. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
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flow from determining whether a claim falls within the scope of
§ 1331, it is surprising to learn that we lack a coherent view of what
statutory federal question jurisdiction entails. Professor Mishkin
famously forwarded the classic theory that § 1331 jurisdiction lies
when a plaintiff raises "a substantial claim founded 'directly' upon
federal law." 5 But the federal courts have failed to establish a unified
6
theory or practice of § 1331 in conformity with this view or any other.
Academia has similarly failed to coalesce around Mishkin's, or anyone
else's, principles.7 This is not to say that § 1331 jurisdiction is always
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, tbl. C-2 (2006), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/caseload2006/tables/C02_Mar_06.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2008).
3.
See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868) (holding that without subject
matter jurisdiction a federal court is only empowered to dismiss the cause before it).
4.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
581, 593-95 (1998) (empirical study finding that the removal of a case from the state court
system to the federal system reduced plaintiffs statistical likelihood of winning from 53% to
33%).
5.
Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question"in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
168 (1953).
6.
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314
(2005) ("These considerations have kept us from stating a 'single, precise, all-embracing' test for
jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties."); Steel
Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) ("Jurisdiction... is a word of many, too
many, meanings .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983):
Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1,
18 Stat. 470, the statutory phrase 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States' has resisted all attempts to frame a single,
precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and which cases
fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts.
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Defining when a claim arises under
federal law has drawn much attention but no simple solutions."), aff'd, 503 U.S. 131 (1992);
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 328 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Attempting to
define an all inclusive test which will determine if a case 'arises under' the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States is like the exercise performed by the daughters of Danaus,
condemned for eternity, as they were, to draw water with a sieve."), aff'd sub nom. Arcudi v.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. 463 U.S. 1220 (1983); Div. 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFLCIO v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 663 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Commentators on the
issue of the proper scope of federal question jurisdiction seem agreed on only one proposition: no
completely satisfactory analytical framework has yet been devised."); First Nat'l Bank of
Aberdeen v. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Formulation of a general
test for determining when an action 'arises under' federal law has eluded the courts for more
than a century ..
").
7.
See, e.g., G. Merle Bergman, Reappraisalof Federal Question Jurisdiction,46 MICH. L.
REV. 17, 18-45 (1946) (tracing the history of federal question jurisprudence); James H.
Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdictionof Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639,
671 (1942) (calling for a more technical, rule-based approach to jurisdiction); William Cohen, The
Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly"Under FederalLaw, 115 U. PA. L.
REV. 890, 916 (1967) (noting that without the well-pleaded complaint rule, more careful thought
about federal question jurisdiction would be required); Ray Forrester, The Nature of a "Federal
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a puzzle.8 It is assuredly true that in most cases, a plaintiffs suit
raising a federal claim will arise under § 1331, while a plaintiffs suit
to litigate state-law questions will not.9 But there remains a
significant proportion of cases where determining the existence of
§ 1331 jurisdiction is vexatious. 10
In an effort to determine the contours of § 1331's border,
scholars have converged upon two perceived truths, which now
predominate our understanding of § 1331 federal question jurisdiction.
First, the predominant view holds that federal question jurisdiction
has little to do with congressional intent despite Congress's
constitutional power to regulate the statutory jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts. 1 Professor Friedman, in one of the definitive works in
Question," 16 TUL. L. REV. 362, 364-85 (1942) (describing the various interpretations of "arising
under"); Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on
'Arising Under" Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 340 (2007) (suggesting that "federal question
jurisdiction might be more compelling for questions of law rather than application of clearly
established law to fact"); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A Reconsideration of
Federal Question JurisdictionOver Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 22
(1984) (suggesting that "courts may make sensible judgments about both what is necessary and
what is sufficient to support federal jurisdiction by returning to the [Holmes's] standard... of
'the law that creates the cause of action' "); Ernest J. London, "FederalQuestion"Jurisdiction-A
Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 835 (1959) (arguing that the federal question
criterion is an unsuitable test for original jurisdiction); Mishkin, supra note 5 ("[T]he criterion for
original federal jurisdiction [is a] substantial claim founded 'directly' upon federal law."); John B.
Oakley, Federal Jurisdictionand the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What 'Arise
Under" Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1831 (1998) (suggesting that the claim is the
"fundamental unit of litigation for purposes of federal jurisdiction"); Charles A. Willard, When
Does a Case 'Arise" Under Federal Laws?, 45 AM. L. REV. 373 (1911) (describing the various
interpretations of "arising under"); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question
Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2273 (2002)
[hereinafter Mr. Smith] (arguing that "shaping the doctrine on the basis of the competencies of
and the comity between the federal and state systems may best serve the values of federal
question jurisdiction while allowing for relatively clear jurisdictional rules").
8.

13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562 (2d ed.

1984) ("This lack of clarity in an important jurisdictional statute would be intolerable were it not
for the fact that the cases raising a serious question whether jurisdiction exists are
comparatively rare.").
9. Id.
10. In fact, the Court's guidance in this regard often amounts to statements such as:
jurisdiction vests upon the "common-sense accommodation of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic
situations" that present a federal issue, in "a selective process which picks the substantial causes
out of the web and lays the other ones aside." Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109,
117-18 (1936).

11. The Constitution prescribes the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the federal
courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. As a matter of constitutional law, the scope of federal
question jurisdiction, jurisdiction "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States," is quite broad. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822-23 (1824)
(holding that any federal "ingredient" is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's federal question
jurisdiction parameters). Despite this broad constitutional scope, the Constitution is not selfexecuting in this regard. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
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this regard, argues that "Congress's intent [in enacting § 1331] has
had little or nothing to do with the Court's decisions concerning what
constitutes a federal question." 12 Many others contend forcefully that
jurisdiction is properly a function of judicial discretion 13 in which
the proper division of labor
judges, not Congress, must determine
14
between the state and federal courts.
Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, and it may grant
a narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is found in Article III. See, e.g., Paul M.
Bator, CongressionalPower Over the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030,
1031 (1982) (espousing the traditional view that Congress is not required by Article III to vest
full constitutional subject matter jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts). Contra Akhil Reed
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separatingthe Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction,65
B.U. L. REV. 205, 209 (1985) (arguing that Congress must vest some of the Article III heads of
jurisdiction in the federal judiciary); Laurence H. Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering:Zoning
Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 129, 134 (1981) (arguing
that there are non-Article III limits to Congress's discretion in vesting inferior federal courts
with subject matter jurisdiction). Exercising this control over inferior courts, Congress withheld
general federal question jurisdiction from them until 1875. See Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch.
137, 18 Stat. 470; Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73
MINN. L. REV. 349, 363, 365 n.76 (1988) (stating that the 1875 Act was the first general
congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts and that it is the
predecessor statute to § 1331, the current statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction).
12. Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal
Jurisdiction,85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1990).
13. See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made JurisdictionLaw, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (1990) (contending that judges are in a good position "to fill out
some of the details in jurisdictional statutes"); Jack M. Beermann, "Bad"Judicial Activism and
Liberal Federal-CourtsDoctrine: A Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1053, 1061-66 (1990) (suggesting that judicial discretion helps federal
courts avoid overload); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588
(1985) (arguing that "the responsibility of the federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and
should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of reasoned discretion in matters relating
to federal jurisdiction"); David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the Allocation of JurisdictionBetween
State and Federal Courts:A Response to "Reassessingthe Allocation of JudicialBusiness Between
State and Federal Courts," 78 VA. L. REV. 1839 (1992) (arguing that "history, tradition, and
policy support the existence of limited judicial discretion to interpret and apply jurisdictional
grants and to refrain from reaching the merits of a controversy even when the existence of
jurisdiction is clear"); Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L.
REV. 1097, 1132 (1985) (contending that "judge made rules restricting federal jurisdiction are not
a judicial usurpation of power").
14. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,
8 (1983) (stating that the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction "masks a welter of issues regarding the
interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial
system" (footnote omitted)); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 622 (1981) ("[State and federal courts] will continue to be
partners in the task of defining and enforcing federal constitutional principles. The question
remains as to where to draw the lines; but line-drawing is the correct enterprise."); Barry
Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:Allocating Cases Between Federal and State
Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2004) ("A central task of the law of federal jurisdiction is
allocating cases between state and federal courts."); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation
of JudicialBusiness Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdictionand "The Martian
Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1772-87 (1992) (discussing seven factors relevant to
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The second assumption of the predominant view is that § 1331
jurisdiction doctrine is an internally inconsistent body of law. For
instance, scholars have often noted that there are two distinct bodies
of doctrine (viz., the Holmes test and the Smith test) 15 that offer
16
competing rubrics for the vesting of federal question jurisdiction.
Others argue that § 1331 is even more fractured than this bipartite
division suggests. Professor Cohen, for example, rejects the notion
that § 1331 can be, "or should be, [understood in terms of] a single, allpurpose, neutral analytical concept which marks out federal question
jurisdiction."' 7 This perceived incoherence has led some courts to
complain that § 1331 jurisdiction is more of a "Serbonian bog"' 8 than
an easily applied rule, while others lament that "[a]ttempting to
define an all inclusive test which will determine if a case 'arises under'
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is like the
exercise performed by the daughters of Danaus, condemned for
eternity, as they were, to draw water with a sieve."' 9
Naturally, not everyone is pleased with the assumptions of the
predominant view. Many would welcome a greater focus on legislative
20
intent in the area of statutory federal question jurisdiction.

determining the proper allocation of judicial power between the states and the federal
government); Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 625 (1991) (stating that "the
challenge [of allocating cases between state and federal court] lies in finding a principled means
of identifying those cases that belong in federal court").
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is JurisdictionJurisdictional?,95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207,
1241-45 (2001) (describing the Court's "two-track" approach to § 1331 jurisdiction); Freer, supra
note 7, at 324-28 (arguing that the Smith line of cases employs a different test than the Holmes
line of cases); Oakley, supra note 7, at 1837-43 (describing the distinction between Category-I
and Category-II jurisdiction).
17. Cohen, supra note 7, at 907; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g &
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) (admitting that the Court has consistently refused to "stat[e] a
single, precise, all-embracing test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law
claims between nondiverse parties" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
sources cited supra note 14.
19. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 328 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463
U.S. 1220 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1969) (finding that the Constitution
places the power to "expand the jurisdiction of [the lower federal] courts ... specifically... in the

Congress, not in the courts"); Mishkin, supra note 5, at 159 ("[I]t is desirable that Congress be
competent to bring to an initial national forum all cases in which the vindication of federal policy
may be at stake."); Redish, supra note 14, at 1790-91 (welcoming a greater focus upon
congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARv. L. REV. 924, 1007 (2000) ('Rather
than naturalizing a set of problems as intrinsically and always 'federal [questions for
jurisdictional purposes],' I urge an understanding of 'the federal' as (almost) whatever Congress
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Similarly, numerous jurists and scholars have called for a "bright-line"
approach to jurisdictional doctrine in order to bring clarity and
certainty to these issues. 21 I contend that (absent wholesale statutory
revision) both of these goals can be achieved to the greatest extent
possible by reconceptualizing § 1331 jurisdiction. In furtherance of
this end, in this Article I recast § 1331 jurisdiction as a function of the
viability of the federal right a plaintiff asserts and congressional
control over the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, as
22
expressed by the creation of a cause of action.
This reconceptualization in terms of both rights and causes of
action affords two benefits over leading theories of statutory federal
question jurisdiction. First, this reinterpretation affords congressional
intent a more prominent role in grounding § 1331 jurisdiction. This is
the case because Congress expresses an intent to vest § 1331
jurisdiction not only when it creates a cause of action, as the Holmes
test suggests, but also when it creates rights. Because congressional
control over the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
is indubitably a constitutionally enshrined prerogative, 23 this new

deems to be in need of national attention, be it kidnapping, alcohol consumption, bank robbery,
fraud, or nondiscrimination.").
21. See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 320-22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (lamenting the
lack of clear cut rules for § 1331 jurisdiction); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 818 (1988) (arguing that uncertain jurisdictional rules have the regrettable effect of
allowing "[p]arties [to] ... spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and
expense were wasted in a court that lacked jurisdiction"); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 821 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating a view held by many
that § 1331 doctrine as it now stands is "infinitely malleable"); Friedman, supra note 14, at 1225
("One ought not make a fetish of bright line rules, but they have their place, and one place in
particular is the law of jurisdiction."); John F. Preis, Jurisdictionand Discretion in Hybrid Law
Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 190-92 (2006) (calling for the adoption of a rule, as opposed to a
standard, in Smith.style cases); Redish, supra note 14, at 1794 (suggesting that "jurisdictional
uncertainty can surely lead to both a waste of judicial time and added expense to the litigants").
22. This Article is solely focused upon § 1331 jurisdiction. To be clear, there are numerous
important jurisdictional concepts that I am not addressing in this Article. First, this is an
analysis of § 1331 federal question jurisdiction, not the scope of the Constitution's grant of
federal question jurisdiction or any other federal question jurisdictional statute. Second, this
Article does not address discretionary abstentions from the exercise of jurisdiction. My interest
here is only whether § 1331 vests in the first instance, not whether a court should decline to
exercise jurisdiction it statutorily possesses. Nor does this Article address other doctrines, such
as standing or sovereign immunity, that have jurisdiction implications which are not unique to §
1331 jurisdiction. Finally, this Article focuses solely on the conditions necessary for vesting
jurisdiction under § 1331. While in most cases these conditions will be sufficient as well,
Congress certainly may add additional requirements before a case can arise under § 1331 (e.g.,
Congress may add an amount in controversy requirement). See infra note 32 (discussing amount
in controversy requirements previously attached to federal question jurisdiction).
23. See supranote 11.
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view advances deeply rooted constitutional values 24 by taking all
indicators of congressional intent into account.
Second, this reinterpretation of the § 1331 canon fosters clarity.
The Court often asserts that the Holmes test, which focuses
exclusively upon the federal versus state origin of the cause of action
as the controlling factor for the taking of § 1331 jurisdiction, supports
the majority of § 1331 cases. 25 Yet, the Holmes test is neither a
necessary nor sufficient condition for § 1331 jurisdiction. Given the
supposed prominence of the Holmes test, its many exceptions appear
unprincipled, leading only to confusion.
I contend that the Court's apparently disparate § 1331 opinions
may be better explained in terms of balancing federal rights against
the source of the cause of action asserted. This reinterpretation shapes
the Court's § 1331 jurisprudence into three standards, which
increasingly restrict access to the federal courts. Under the first
standard, § 1331 jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff asserts a cause of
action arising from either a statute, treaty, or the Constitution that is
paired with a "colorable" federal right. Under the second standard,
§ 1331 lies when a plaintiff alleges a state-law-created cause of action
and asserts a "substantial" federal right. Under the third standard,
§ 1331 jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff asserts a pure federal common
law cause of action and a substantial federal common law right
coupled with a sufficient showing to support the right.
Because all three standards involve the same process of
balancing federal rights against causes of action, these three
standards should not be seen as competing tests. Rather, these
standards are different instantiations of a unified approach: a test
that seeks to vest § 1331 jurisdiction where there is congressional
intent to do so as evidenced by the balancing of asserted federal rights
against causes of action. I coin this approach the unified balancing
principle. These three instantiations of the unified balancing principle,
then, foster important efficiency and transparency values by explicitly
laying out relevant jurisdictional standards and reconciling when
these competing standards apply.
I proceed as follows. In Part II, I first review traditional federal
question jurisdiction doctrine. Next, I lay out the key concepts of right,
cause of action, colorable, and substantial. I employ these concepts in
reinterpreting § 1331 jurisprudence in the remainder of this Article.

24.
25.

See, e.g., supranote 20.
Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808.
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In Part III, I proceed to reinterpret the § 1331 canon in terms
26
of the source for the federal right asserted: namely, statutory,
constitutional, or federal common law. In so doing, I contend that the
Court's holdings are best understood, not by focusing solely upon the
origin of the cause of action, but by focusing upon two concepts: the
viability of the federal right asserted and the cause of action asserted.
These dual foci guide the reinterpretation of the Court's § 1331
jurisprudence into the three clarity-inducing standards outlined
above.
In Part IV, I argue that these standards are best understood as
instantiations of a unified balancing principle. Under this principle, as
the indicia that Congress wishes to grant plaintiffs the ability to
vindicate particular rights in federal court increases, plaintiffs' need
to assert a viable federal right lessens. Conversely, when there are few
other indicia that Congress wishes plaintiffs to vindicate particular
rights in federal court, plaintiffs must assert a more robust claim to a
federal right for § 1331 jurisdiction to lie. Under this analysis, the
existence of a nonjudicially created 27 federal cause of action
constitutes significant (but not the only) evidence of congressional
intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction. I further contend that this unified
understanding of § 1331 jurisdiction not only brings clarity to this
important body of jurisdictional doctrine but it advances the
important constitutional norm of congressional control over the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
II. LAYING A NEW CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION
In this Part, I seek to lay the conceptual foundation for a
fruitful reinterpretation of the Court's § 1331 jurisprudence. I begin
with a brief primer on blackletter federal question jurisdiction
doctrine. I note that cases comprising the heart of the traditional view
often present analyses of § 1331 jurisdiction in terms of "right," "cause
of action," or "claims," as modified by the notions of "colorable" and
"substantial." As such, I turn next to an introduction of the
contemporary understandings of the concepts of right, cause of action,
claim, and remedy in an effort to obtain a deeper understanding of the
26. I also include rights created by treaty under this rubric.
27. I do not consider causes of action inferred from a statute or the Constitution to be
judicially created. The Court consistently holds that such an inference is an exercise in statutory
interpretation, not judicial fiat. See infra note 358. Of course, this is a contested issue. I have no
desire to enter into this fray in this Article. See cases cited infra note 362. I am merely employing
"nonjudicially created" to distinguish causes of action created as a matter of federal common law,
which I consider judicially created, from all others. I intend nothing more.

1676

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:6:1667

Court's often clich6d statements of jurisdiction doctrine. I conclude by
defining the terms colorable rights and substantial rights, which play
a central role in Part III's recharacterization of § 1331 cases.
A. Federal Question JurisdictionDoctrine Primer
In 1875, Congress passed the first general grant of federal
question jurisdiction now codified in § 1331.28 Even though the
language of § 1331 parallels that of Article III of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court does not hold that § 1331 federal question jurisdiction
is identical in scope to the constitutional federal question jurisdiction
provision.2 9 Indeed, the Court interprets § 1331 as granting a much
narrower scope of jurisdiction than the Constitution permits. 30 In
furtherance of this generally restrictive interpretive principle, all
§ 1331 jurisdictional cases are subject to the well-pleaded complaint
rule. 31 Following this rule, only federal issues raised in a plaintiffs
complaint, not anticipated defenses, establish federal question
32
jurisdiction.
Doctrinal orthodoxy states that the Court has established two
independent and irreconcilable tests for determining when a
complaint raises a well-pleaded federal question. 33 According to the
blackletter view, the majority of federal question cases 34 vest under
§ 1331 because federal law-be it by statute, treaty, Constitution or
28.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). This statute has not always been codified here. Nevertheless, I
do not employ the cumbersome "predecessor statute to § 1331" locution when referring to cases
dealing with the Act as codified in a different location. Instead, I simply refer to this Act as
§ 1331, even if at a previous time it was codified at a different location. This approach is sound
because, excepting statutory amounts in controversy, the Act has been essentially unchanged
since 1875. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980) (striking out the minimum amount
in controversy requirement of $10,000); Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (raising the
minimum amount in controversy requirement from $3,000 to $10,000). Finally, following most
scholars, I exclude the short-lived general grant of federal question jurisdiction passed at the end
of President John Adams's term and treat the 1875 Act as the first general federal question
grant.
29.
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 494 (1983).
30.
Id. The Constitution prescribes the limits of subject matter jurisdiction for the federal
courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. As a matter of constitutional law, the scope of federal
question jurisdiction-jurisdiction "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States"-is quite broad. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822-23 (1824)
(holding that any federal "ingredient" is sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's federal question
jurisdiction parameters). Despite this broad constitutional scope, the Constitution is not
self-executing in this regard. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807 (1986).
31. Randall, supra note 11, at 370.
32. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing
the rule).
33. See sources cited supra note 16.
34. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808.
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federal common law 35-creates the plaintiffs cause of action. 36 Justice
Holmes so forcefully advocated for this understanding of § 1331 that
this view is often referred to as the Holmes test. Pursuant to the
second blackletter test, federal question jurisdiction will lie over statelaw causes of action that necessarily require construction of an
embedded federal question.3 7 As Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co. 38 is the Court's classic statement of this position, this line of cases
is often referred to as the Smith test. In Smith, a stockholder-plaintiff
brought a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action under state law.
Thus, this case would not satisfy the Holmes test as it was not brought
under a federal cause of action. But the Court held that federal
question jurisdiction arose under § 1331 because an element of the
plaintiffs
state-law
claim
required
adjudication
of
the
39
act.
federal
a
of
constitutionality
The traditional view thus places the Court's § 1331 canon into
two camps. Under the Holmes test, § 1331 jurisdiction arises if, and
only if, the cause of action is created by federal law. Under the Smith
test, a state-law cause of action may arise under § 1331 if an element
of the claim necessarily requires the construction of federal law. As a
corollary to the predominant view's depiction, the traditional view
treats these tests as irreconcilable.

B. Rights, Causes of Action, Claims, and Remedies
While the classic formulations of the Holmes and Smith tests
appear to place great importance upon the "law that creates the cause
of action,"40 the Court has not focused consistently upon the source of
the cause of action in rendering jurisdictional decisions. In many
35. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("[Section] 1331 jurisdiction will support
claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.")
36. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.)
(applying this language: "arises under the law that creates the cause of action").
37. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1,
9 (1983) (finding the Holmes test as a rule of inclusion (quoting T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339
F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.))); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312-13 (2005) (discussing the Smith test); Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
808-09 (same); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921):
The general rule is that, where it appears from the bill or statement of the
plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application
of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that such federal claim
is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable foundation, the District
Court has jurisdiction under this provision.
38. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
39. Id. at 199-202.
40. Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260.
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cases, the Court states that a suit will arise under § 1331 if "the
plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law."4 1 Still other cases state that
§ 1331 vests upon the presentation of a "federal interest" 42 or a
"federal issue."43 This myriad of locutions only creates confusion,
presenting an ever-changing conceptual focus for the jurisdictional
question. 44 The situation is made worse by the fact that the contexts
from which many of these terms are drawn are now outdated, draped
in jargon no longer employed, 45 couched in antiquated modes of
pleading, or inappropriately borrowed from analyses of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction. 46 Thus, I proceed by deconstructing these
stock phrases and begin my analysis of § 1331 with a crisper
understanding of the following notions-"right," "cause of action,"
"claim," and "remedy"-that the Court continually employs as
foundational jurisdictional concepts for its § 1331 jurisprudence.
Traditionally, the concepts of right, cause of action, and remedy
were thought to be immutably linked-one did not exist without the
other. 47 As Justice Harlan noted, "contemporary modes of
jurisprudential thought ... appeared to link 'rights' and 'remedies' in
a 1:1 correlation." 48 Indeed, Marbury v. Madison held that "it is a
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there
is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is
invaded. '49 Moreover, under this earlier jurisprudence, "courts did not

41. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28.
42. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12.
43. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005);
Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974).
44. Oakley, supranote 7, at 1853 (noting various uses of the terms "claim" and "theory").
45. LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 91 (1994) (lamenting Supreme
Court doctrine that "needlessly confuse[s] matters with outdated jargon and misleading
generalizations," and advocating "jurisdictional rules that can easily be applied at the outset of
litigation"). Further, many of these stock phrases were inappropriately transferred from old
cases involving appellate jurisdiction, rendering their use in the § 1331 context highly suspect.
See Cohen, supranote 7, at 904; Mishkin, supra note 5, at 160-63.
46. Cohen, supra note 7, at 904 (noting that phrases had been uncritically transferred from
earlier cases).
47. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777,
783 (2004) ("At the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause
of action was generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law
and in equity afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance."); Donald H. Zeigler,
Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67, 71-83
(2001) (describing the traditional approach to rights, causes of action and remedies).
48. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
401 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
49. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES
*23).
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view a cause of action as a separate procedural entity, independent of
a right and remedy, that had to be present for an action to go
forward." 50 Given this congruity, it is understandable that in times
past, the Court would use the terms cause of action, right, and remedy
interchangeably in jurisdictional analyses. But the traditional
understanding of these terms as synonyms is no longer an accurate
reflection of doctrine. Thus, the continued treatment of these terms as
synonyms in jurisdictional analyses induces confusion.
This traditional jurisprudence of congruity had, by the 1970s,
given way to a new regime. 5 1 Starting with National Railroad
52
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers,
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,53 and Cort v. Ash,5 4 the
Court began explicitly differentiating rights from the ability to enforce
them by way of a cause of action. 55 By the end of the decade, the Court
in Davis v. Passman56 squarely held that the notions of right, cause of
action, claim, and remedy constituted distinct analytic concepts. The
Court continues to adhere to this basic framework established in
Passman.
A "right," under the contemporary analysis, is an obligation
owed by the defendant to which the plaintiff is an intended
beneficiary. 57 This notion of obligation can be thought of in a
Hohfeldian sense in that the obligation imposes a correlative duty
upon the defendant to either refrain from interfering with, or to assist,
the plaintiff.58 In the Court's view, however, an obligation standing
alone is not sufficient for the recognition of a right. To qualify as a

50. Zeigler, supra note 47, at 72.
51. Id. at 84-104. Zeigler notes this as a sea-change. But see Fitzgerald, supra note 16
(noting how the two-track approach has developed over many decades).
52. 414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974) (acknowledging the existence of rights and duties under the
Amtrak Act but questioning whether respondent had a cause of action to enforce them).
53. 421 U.S. 412, 420-23 (1975) (acknowledging that the Securities Investor Protection Act
grants plaintiffs beneficial rights, but questioning whether they have a cause of action to force
the agency to enforce them).
54. 422 U.S. 66, 74-85 (1975) (noting that the corporate action in question was in violation
of a federal criminal statute, but questioning whether plaintiffs had a cause of action to privately
enforce the prohibition).
55. Zeigler, supra note 47, at 85-86.
56. 442 U.S. 228, 238-39 (1979).
57. Id.
58. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710-70 (1917) (critiquing legal analysis for imprecise use of
terminology, and introducing the idea that rights are best understood as obligations coupled with
correlative duties); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied
in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 16-59 (1913) (same).
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right, an obligation must be mandatory, not merely hortatory.5 9
Further, for obligations to constitute rights, the language at issue
must not be "too vague and amorphous" or "beyond the competence of
the judiciary to enforce." 60 This three-part test (viz., identifying
mandatory obligation, clear statement, and enforceability 6l) remains
the standard by which the Court determines when a right exists. 62
A "cause of action," by contrast, is a determination of whether
the plaintiff falls into a class of litigants empowered to enforce a right
in court. 63 Or as the Passman Court alternatively put the concept,
"a cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a
member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law,
appropriately invoke the power of the court." 64 The concept of cause of
action, then, is necessarily related to the concept of a right insofar as
plaintiffs must have rights before they can be persons empowered to
enforce them. But the concept of cause of action is not to be confused
with the notion of a right itself under this contemporary view. Indeed,
one may have a right, yet lack the power to enforce the right. For
example, an individual's rights under certain statutory schemes may
only be vindicated by an administrative agency. 65 That is, Congress
may vest individuals with rights but not vest them with causes of
action to enforce those rights by way of private suit. As a corollary,
59. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (finding that
provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act "were intended to
be hortatory, not mandatory").
60. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1987).
61. This last prong is, or nearly is, identical to the concept of remedy. But whether a court
can issue an effective remedy is best understood as a matter of standing. See Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (discussing redressability). Including redressability in
the rights analysis is double counting at best. A more troubling result could be the collapse of the
distinction between rights and remedy as this final statement appears to incorporate
redressability as part of the rights analysis. Given that the Court has consistently striven since
the 1970s to distinguish between rights and remedies, see Zeigler, supra note 47, at 84-104,
however, it would be a disservice to read this collapse into this Article's jurisdictional analysis
unless it is absolutely necessary. I will, therefore, focus on the notions of mandatory obligation
and clear statement.
62. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); see also Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (discussing the three-part test); Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512
U.S. 107, 132-33 (1994) (same); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (same); Wilder v. Va.
Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990) (same).
63. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
64. Id. at 239 n.18.
65. See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457
(1974) (holding that the power to vindicate rights rests with the Attorney General); see also
Passman, 442 U.S. at 241 ("For example, statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in
complex regulatory schemes, so that if they are not enforced through private causes of action,
they may nevertheless be enforced through alternative mechanisms, such as criminal
prosecutions, or other public causes of actions." (internal citations omitted)).
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then, a plaintiff in a federal question case can fail to present a cause of
action either by failing to implicate a federal right or by failing to be a
member of the class of litigants empowered to enforce the federal right
at issue.
A "claim" constitutes its own concept. As the Passman Court
held, in order to have a claim, one must have a cause of action. 66 But
again, cause of action is but a necessary, not a sufficient, condition to
having a claim. To be clear, the Passman Court uses cause of action in
the sense that a plaintiff is a member of a class entitled to enforce
rights in court, not in the sense that the term was used under the
former code and writ pleading schemes. Those older usages of the
term were rejected by the authors of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 67 Thus, in order to have a federal claim in this
contemporary sense, a plaintiff must: (1) assert a federal right; (2) be a
member of the class of persons entitled to enforce the right (i.e., assert
a cause of action); and (3) possess the other attributes of a claim,
which means an assertion of a transaction or occurrence sufficient, if
true, to justify a remedy. 68 Thus, one may possess a right and a cause
of action without possessing a claim. For example, a plaintiff may
possess a cause of action-in the sense that a plaintiff has a right and
to the
is empowered to enforce it in court-yet lack a claim due
69
remedy.
a
justify
would
that
facts
inability to allege adequate
Finally, under the contemporary view, the notion of claim is
analytically distinct from, and prior to, the question of what "relief'
may be afforded. 70 Traditionally, the correlation of rights with
remedies empowered federal courts to employ all available remedies to

66. Passman, 442 U.S. at 239 ("If a litigant is an appropriate party to invoke the power of
the courts, it is said that he has a 'cause of action' under the statute, and that this cause of action
is a necessary element of his 'claim.' ").
67. Id. at 237-39. But see Bellia, supra note 47, passim (arguing that the understanding of
cause of action as it was used under common law writ pleading illuminates the original meaning
of constitutional federal question jurisdiction).
68. See Douglas D. McFarland, The True Compass: No Federal Question in a State Law
Claim, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 27 n.160 (2006) ("Understanding the fact-based, transactional
nature of a claim is important throughout the federal rules and federal jurisdictional statutes.
Kinship of the 'claim' to the commonly encountered 'transaction or occurrence' is apparent."). On
the other hand, Professor John Oakley has attempted to distinguish causes of action from claims
in the following way: a cause of action should refer to "a transaction or occurrence," and a claim
for relief should refer to "the legal theories upon which relief depends." Oakley, supra note 7, at
1858-59.
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (listing as a defense to a claim for relief, "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted").
70. Passman, 442 U.S. at 239.
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vindicate the violation of a federal right. 71 More recently, the Court
has been reserved in its statements about the presumption that all
wrongs always have an available remedy; the Court has even allowed
for the possibility that a right coupled with a cause of action might
72
sometimes provide no relief.
C. Colorable and Substantive Rights
Not every invocation of the Holmes or Smith test will arise
under § 1331, however. The Court further limits federal question
jurisdiction to those cases raising substantial rights. 73 But the Court
does not consistently employ the modifier "substantial." Often, it holds
that a merely "colorable" federal claim will arise under § 1331. 74 In
some instances, the Court appears to use these terms-substantial
and colorable-as synonyms. 75 In still other instances, it employs the
term colorable as an antonym to substantial. 76 In yet other cases, it
appears that substantial is used in a manner meant to convey
something more than merely colorable. 77 The best course here is to
proceed, as the Court once noted, by considering these concepts within
the context of each case. 78 To this end, I will define colorable and
71. Ziegler, supra note 47, at 95; see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S.
582, 595 (1983) ("[W]here legal rights have been invaded and a cause of action is available, a
federal court may use any available remedy to afford full relief.").
72. Ziegler, supra note 47, at 96; see also City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation., 544 U.S.
197, 213 (2005) ("The distinction between a claim or substantive right and a remedy is
fundamental." (quotations and citations omitted)).
73. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (noting that
jurisdiction lies unless it is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous").
74. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006) ("A claim invoking
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Bell held, may be dismissed for want of
subject matter jurisdiction if it is not colorable .... ").
75. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71-72 (1978)
("It is enough for present purposes that the claimed cause of action to vindicate appellees'
constitutional rights is sufficiently substantial and colorable to sustain jurisdiction under
§ 1331(a).").
76. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 555 (1974) ("Of course, the Federal question
must not be merely colorable or fraudulently set up for the mere purpose of endeavoring to give
the court jurisdiction." (citation omitted)).
77. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983) (holding that federal question jurisdiction lies in "only those cases in which
a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that
the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law").
78. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 823 n.3 (1986):
FranchiseTax Board states that the plaintiffs right to relief must necessarily
depend upon resolution of a "substantial" federal question. In context,
however, it is clear that this was simply another way of stating that the
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substantial as differing terms, but in employing them I will attempt to
use these terms, per my definitions of them, in a contextually
appropriate manner regardless of the terms employed by the Court.
I define "colorable right" in the following manner. An assertion
of a federal right is colorable so long as it is not "patently without
merit,"79 "frivolous,"8 0 "immaterial or made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction."8 1 A right fails to meet this low bar if, for
example, it is merely a procedural right (i.e., applicable only in the
context of litigation) as opposed to a substantive right (i.e., applicable
outside of the context of litigation).8 2 Similarly, if a plaintiffs
allegation of a right is absolutely foreclosed by prior decisions of the
Supreme Court, and it is not a good faith attempt to overrule the
precedent, it is not an assertion of a colorable right.8 3 Conversely, a
substantive right meets this standard if it has "any arguable basis in
law."8 4 That is to say, a right is colorable if it is not merely procedural
and there is at least one interpretation of the federal law alleged,
which is not absolutely barred, that would allow a plaintiff to

federal question must be colorable and have a reasonable foundation. This
understanding is consistent with the manner in which the Smith test has
always been applied, as well as with the way we have used the concept of a
"substantial" federal question in other cases concerning federal jurisdiction.
79. Hagans, 415 U.S. at 542-43.
80. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683 (1946).
81. Id.
82. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002) (finding a removal
statute "requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be
removed from a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of
ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement."); Palkow v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) ('Merely invoking the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure [60] is not sufficient grounds to establish federal question jurisdiction."); Milan
Express, Inc. v. Averitt Express, Inc., 208 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding in regard to
Rule 65.1 that a "federal rule cannot be the basis of original jurisdiction"); Cresswell v. Sullivan
& Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The Rules do not provide an independent ground for
subject matter jurisdiction over an action for which there is no other basis for jurisdiction."); Port
Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the court lacks jurisdiction to
hear a suit directly under Rule 11); Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding
that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act does not create colorable rights, but rather
provides a choice of law rule and as such the court lacks jurisdiction).
83. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974):
[The basis for petitioners' assertion that they had a federal right to
possession governed wholly by federal law cannot be said to be so
insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or
otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate
resolution of the federal issues on the merits.
84. Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties Rail Users Ass'n, Inc., 287 F.3d 568,
573 (6th Cir. 2002).
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prevail-even if the courts refuse to adopt this interpretation.8 5
Further, a right is colorable in cases where neither party is contesting
the legal content of the right, but rather where the parties are
86
contesting only factual issues related to the vindication of the right.
Further still, the veracity of the plaintiffs factual averments is
87
immaterial to this jurisdictional question.
I define "substantial rights" using a more rigorous test,
following the Smith line of cases.8 8 To be substantial, an allegation of
a right must be at least a colorable one. But a substantial allegation of
a right must present more than a mere assertion that there is at least
one interpretation of a federal substantive right that is not absolutely
barred, under which the plaintiff could prevail. In cases using the
substantiality standard, § 1331 jurisdiction "demands ... a serious
federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a
federal forum."8 9 Or as Professor Freer explains the term, to be
substantial the right at issue must be central to the litigation and
contested by the parties. 90 That is, the federal right at issue must be
the dispositive issue in the case, not merely one of several issues that

85. See Bell, 327 U.S. at 685 ("[Tlhe right of the petitioners to recover under their complaint
will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United States are given one construction
and will be defeated if they are given another.").
86. Mishkin, supra note 5, at 169-74.
87. Bell, 327 U.S. at 682 ("Jurisdiction... is not defeated.., by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.").
88. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005)
(using substantial in this manner); see also Freer, supra note 7, at 329 (arguing that the Smith
line of cases employs a different test than the Holmes line of cases).
89. Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313 (citing Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156,
164 (1997)); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814, 816 n.14 (1986)
(noting that a federal court may review a federal issue in a state cause of action); Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983):
Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or
by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint established either that federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.
Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936) (noting that a federal question
exists when a "right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States [is] an
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiffs cause of action"); Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S.
561, 569 (1912):
A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United
States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those
laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a
dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a
law, upon the determination of which the result depends.
90. Freer, supra note 7, at 310.
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could throw the outcome to one party or the other. 91 Further, to allege
a substantial federal right, the parties must contest the legal content
of the right, meaning they are not fighting solely about the facts that
would vindicate the federal right. 92 Substantiality, in sum, means that
the right asserted is not merely colorable, but that the case depends
upon the vindication of the right asserted and that the parties actually
contest the legal content of the right. Of course, as with colorable
claims to a right, plaintiffs need not actually win or state a claim to
assert a substantial right. 93
These distinctions have explanatory force for federal question
subject matter jurisdiction. While preserving a full defense of this
contention until Part III, I contend that whether federal question
jurisdiction under § 1331 lies is a function of both the viability of the
federal right and the cause of action asserted, understood in the
contemporary sense outlined above.

III. THREE JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS
With these essential concepts at hand, I turn now to a
reinterpretation of the Court's § 1331 canon in terms of rights, both
colorable and substantial, and causes of action. This analysis is
organized by the origin of the asserted federal right. I begin with a
discussion of federal statutory and treaty rights, turning next to
constitutional rights and ending with an analysis of federal common
law rights.
I focus upon rights and causes of action not to downplay the
importance of the concepts of remedy and claim to a successful suit.
Indeed, the Constitution's Cases and Controversies provision requires,
as a jurisdictional matter, that plaintiffs establish the likelihood that
a federal court can afford a remedy should they prevail. 94 This
important jurisdictional rule, however, is not uniquely germane to
§ 1331 cases, but rather constitutes part of the Article III "standing"
requirement to which every font of federal subject matter jurisdiction
is subject. 95 Claim is also a key concept to a successful suit, but as the

91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313 (citing cases supporting this proposition);
Mishkin, supra note 5, at 169-74 (describing this requirement as applying to all § 1331 cases and
critiquing it).
93. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (describing a
losing plaintiff).
94. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
95. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) ("Article III of the
Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' ").
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Court has often held, whether plaintiffs present a claim, even in a
federal question case, is not a jurisdictional matter.96 (I will revisit the
veracity of this proposition during my discussion of federal common
law rights.)
Although most scholars organize § 1331 into two standards
that roughly track the Holmes and Smith tests,97 in conducting this
reinterpretation, I conclude that the Court's opinions are better
grouped into three standards, which further can be explained as
instantiations of the same unified balancing principle. First, if a
plaintiff alleges a nonjudicially created federal cause of action, then
§ 1331 jurisdiction lies if the plaintiff makes a colorable allegation of a
federal right-whether created by a federal statute, treaty, or the
Constitution. Second, if a plaintiff alleges a state-law cause of action,
then § 1331 jurisdiction lies if a plaintiff makes a substantial
assertion of a federal right. Third, if a plaintiff alleges a right and a
cause of action created as a matter of "pure" federal common law, the
plaintiff must not only allege a substantial right but must also make a
showing sufficient to vindicate that right (i.e., plaintiff must present a
claim). These three standards offer both a better explanation of the
Court's past § 1331 holdings and a more transparent guide to future
cases than the traditional Holmes and Smith tests afford.
A. CongressionallyCreated Rights
This Section analyzes the Court's taking § 1331 jurisdiction in
situations where the plaintiff asserts a congressionally created right,
including rights created by treaties. I proceed by reviewing the Court's
§ 1331 cases in terms of the strength of the congressionally created
right asserted and the type of cause of action asserted in five differing
combinations. From this investigation, I draw two conclusions. First,
despite the emphasis upon the source of the cause of action in the
Holmes test as the key jurisdictional factor, an assertion of a federal

96. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951) ("As
frequently happens where jurisdiction depends on subject matter, the question [of] whether
jurisdiction exists... [is often] confused with the question whether the complaint states a cause
of action."). But see infra Part III.C (discussing the Court's treatment of federal common law
cases).
97. See Fitzgerald, supra note 16, at 1241-45 (noting this trend). Further, I am excluding
so-called "protective jurisdiction" from my analysis given that a majority of the Court has never
applied it. The Court's only suggestion as to its appropriateness comes in Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 460
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). Further, as Professor Chemerinsky notes, protective jurisdiction
is likely to remain only as fodder of professorial hypotheticals, not as a significant element of the
Court's jurisdictional doctrine. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 282 (5th ed. 2007).
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right is the essential element needed for § 1331 to vest. Second, the
robustness with which the plaintiff must assert the federal right in
order to ground § 1331 shifts with the origin of the cause of action.

1. Non-Colorable Assertions to Congressionally Created Rights and a
Congressionally Created Cause of Action
I begin with cases in which the plaintiff fails to allege a
colorable federal right yet alleges a congressionally created cause of
action. I analyze two circumstances where such cases arise. The first
encompasses cases in which an act of Congress creates a cause of
action to enforce state-law rights. The second involves the assertion of
a frivolous federal right. In both circumstances, the courts hold that
they lack subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs fail to
assert a colorable federal right. "[D]espite the usual reliability of the
Holmes test,"9 8 these cases, in which the plaintiff possesses a federal
cause of action, illustrate that satisfying the Holmes test is not a
sufficient basis for taking § 1331 jurisdiction.
a. Federal Statutory Causes of Action over State-Law Rights
I focus first upon a set of cases9 9 where Congress has
empowered a class of persons to bring suit (i.e., created a cause of
action) to enforce state-law rights. The Court has not seen fit to hear
these claims under § 1331. The lead case is Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter.100 In Shoshone, Congress authorized suits to determine
adverse claims to mining rights. The act, however, stated that the
claims were to be determined by the "local customs and rules of
miners in the several mining districts ... or by the statute of
limitations for mining claims of the state or territory." 10 1 Thus, the
case presented a situation where state law created all the rights at
issue, but Congress created the cause of action entitling a class of
persons to enforce those state rights.
The issue for the Court was whether the federal act could
create federal question jurisdiction for state-created rights. A
straightforward application of the Holmes test would have found in

98. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 n.12 (1986).
99. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5
(2005) ("For an extremely rare exception to the sufficiency of a federal right of action, see
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507 (1900).").
100. 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900).
101. Id. at 508.
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favor of extending jurisdiction, because the cause of action is obviously
federal in origin. Nevertheless, the Court held there was not
jurisdiction under § 1331 because "the right of possession may not
involve any question as to the construction... of the ... laws of the
United States, but may present simply ... a determination of ... local
rules ... or the effect of state statutes." 10 2 That is to say, the Court
held that a congressionally created cause of action to enforce state-law
rights does not arise under § 1331.103
Similarly, in People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 10 4 the Court
made its clearest statement that the proper focus for evaluating
§ 1331 jurisdiction is upon the assertion of a federal right-not the
federal cause of action. In this case, Puerto Rico sought to collect a
territorial tax debt. 10 5 Congress passed a statute requiring that the
collection of this outstanding tax claim proceed by a suit at law as
opposed to an attachment proceeding. 10 6 Puerto Rico began a suit in
the Puerto Rican courts to collect the tax. The defendant, relying on
the congressional creation of this cause of action, removed the suit to
federal district court, contending that under the Holmes test the case
arose under § 1331. The Court disagreed. Federal question
jurisdiction, the Court held, may only be "invoked to vindicate a right
or privilege claimed under a federal statute.' '10 7 The Court went on to
rule that statutory jurisdiction "may not be invoked where the right
asserted is nonfederal, merely because the plaintiffs right to sue is
derived from federal law."' 0 8 Making the point more bluntly, the Court
concluded that for jurisdictional purposes "[t]he federal nature of the
right to be established is decisive-not the source of the authority to
establish it."109 This rule remains a valid part of the § 1331 fabric,
102. Id. at 509.
103. See also Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1912) (holding that equitable
quiet title actions, although a congressionally approved cause of action, lack statutory federal
question jurisdiction when the right to the land in question is controlled by state law).
104. 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933).
105. Puerto Rico is routinely treated as if it were a state for jurisdictional purposes. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (2000) ('The word 'States', as used in this section, includes.., the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."); Asociacion de Detallistas de Gasolina de P.R., Inc. v. Shell
Chem. Yabucoa, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.P.R. 2005) (finding no § 1331 jurisdiction because
the plaintiff relied exclusively upon Puerto Rican law, which the court characterized as "state
law"). Thus, the distinction between territorial law versus state law is not relevant for § 1331
purposes.
106. Russell, 288 U.S. at 483.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Joy v. City of Saint Louis, 201 U.S. 332, 341 (1906) ('The mere fact that the
title of plaintiff comes from a patent or under an act of Congress does not show that a Federal
question arises.").
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although it is now eclipsed by the dominant rhetoric of the Holmes
test.110
b. FrivolousAssertions to a Federal Statutory Right
The Court employs a like analysis in cases where the alleged
federal right is so frivolous as to be non-colorable. 111 As with
Shoshone, the colorable test is exceedingly difficult to fail, and the test
is rarely used to dismiss a case.1 1 2 A right is non-colorable under this
doctrine only if it is purely procedural or it is wholly without merit,
such as rights barred by previous Supreme Court holdings directly on
point.11 3 In Deming v. CarlislePacking Co., 114 for example, the parties,
who were not completely diverse, went to trial in a Washington state
court over a contract for salmon (i.e., they brought a state-law right
coupled with a state-law cause of action). In a petition for removal to
federal court, two of the three defendants claimed that the third
defendant, who like the plaintiff was a Washington resident, was
joined solely for the purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction. The
petition for removal was denied and, after losing on appeal,
defendants sought United States Supreme Court review. The
defendants argued "that a Federal question was involved in the
110. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5
(2005); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1982) (holding that the
federal courts lack § 1331 jurisdiction over claims under the Urban Mass Transportation Act
because Congress instructed that these rights are to be determined by state law); Bay Shore
Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 735 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the federal courts
lacked § 1331 jurisdiction because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act empowered
plaintiff to sue but the rights at issue were entirely a matter of state law); City Nat'l Bank v.
Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the National Bank Act "is not a
sufficient basis for federal question jurisdiction simply because it incorporates state law" when
the act makes usury, as defined by local state law, illegal and the non-diverse parties were only
contesting the meaning of North Carolina's usury law); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499
F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (deeming no federal question to exist where "the real substance of
the controversy ... turns entirely upon disputed questions of law and fact relating to compliance
with state law, and not at all upon the meaning or effect of the federal statute itself').
111. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ('Dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the
claim is 'so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise
completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.' "); Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 285 (1993); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414
U.S. 661, 666 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946); Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty
Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
112. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) (discussing the difficulty of proving
insubstantiality).
113. See, e.g., id. ("A claim is insubstantial only if 'its unsoundness so clearly results from the
previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference
that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.' ").
114. 226 U.S. 102, 105 (1912).
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refusal to grant the petition for removal." 115 The Court disagreed. In
fact, it held that the defendant's position was so contrary to wellsettled and elementary doctrine that the federal question raised was
"devoid of all merit" such that it failed to give rise to federal question
jurisdiction.1 6 This case arose in the context of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, but later Supreme Court opinions, although
usually in dicta, 117 have interpreted Deming as a limit on § 1331.118
The lower courts do rely on this rule from time to time. For
example, when a plaintiff attempts to ground § 1331 jurisdiction upon
the assertion of a procedural right, the courts jurisdictionally dismiss
the suit. Such is the case where a plaintiff attempts to use the All
Writs Act, 1 9 a choice of law statute, 120 or a rule of procedure1 2' to vest
22
jurisdiction. These procedural bodies of law, while federal in origin,
do not create colorable rights because they do not impose substantive
obligations upon the defendants (i.e., the obligations are inapplicable
23
outside of the context of litigation).'
In reviewing these cases in which plaintiffs possess a federal
cause of action yet fail to allege colorable federal rights, it is clear,

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Crowley Cutlery Co. v. United States, 849 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that
most invocations of the substantiality rule by the Court are in dicta).
118. See supra note 112.
119. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 34 (2002) (finding a removal
statute "requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be
removed from a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of
ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement.").
120. Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act does not create colorable rights, but rather provides a choice of law
rule, and as such the court lacks jurisdiction).
121. Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Merely invoking the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [60] is not sufficient grounds to establish federal question
jurisdiction."); Milan Express, Inc. v. Averitt Express, Inc., 208 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding in regard to Rule 65.1 that a "federal rule cannot be the basis of original jurisdiction");
Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The Rules do not provide an
independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction over an action for which there is no other
basis for jurisdiction."); Port Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
the court lacks jurisdiction to hear a suit directly under Rule 11).
122. In their efficacy as rules of decision, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have "the force
of a federal statute." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941).
123. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072(h) (1990) (stating that the rules of civil procedure "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights"); FED. R. Civ. P. 82 ("These rules do not
extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts."); cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S.
584, 589-90 (1941) ("An authority conferred upon a court to make rules of procedure for the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not an authority to enlarge that jurisdiction .... ").
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despite the numerous incantations of the Holmes test by the Court, 124
that the presence of a congressionally created cause of action is not the
key factor in determining whether a claim will arise under § 1331.
Rather, it is, as the Russell & Co. opinion states, the status of the
federal right as colorable that determines whether the Court takes
125
jurisdiction.
2. Colorable Assertion of a Congressionally Created Right and the
Congressionally Created Cause of Action
By focusing on whether the federal right asserted is colorable,
the Court's treatment of cases with a congressionally created cause of
action and a highly dubious claim to a federal right becomes less
opaque. In such cases, the Court regularly takes jurisdiction. 126 A
recent example can be found in the Court's decision in Blessing v.
1 27 In this case, the plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Freestone.
cause of action. 128 While § 1983 creates a statutory cause of action for
the violation of federal rights by state officials, it does not create

124. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005) ("This provision for federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by plaintiffs
pleading a cause of action created by federal law .... "); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472 (2004)
("Invoking the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1350, among other statutory
bases, they asserted causes of action under the Administrative Procedure Act .... "); Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("It is firmly established in our cases that the
absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter
jurisdiction .. "); City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) ("It is long
settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded
complaint raises issues of federal law." (internal quotation omitted)); Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) ("A district court's federal-question jurisdiction, we
recently explained, extends over only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes .
. . that federal law creates the cause of action ....
(internal quotations omitted)); Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) ("It is long settled law that a cause of action arises
under federal law only when the plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal law.");
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1983):
Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or
by removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or
that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.
125. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933).
126. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (holding plaintiffs 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action barred for lack of a violation of a statutory right without dismissing on
jurisdictional grounds); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341-42 (1997) (same); Suter v.
Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (same). Of course citing these cases could be voluminous,
these are just a sampling of recent § 1983 cases.
127. 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997).
128. Id. at 333.
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rights; rather, it merely empowers a class of persons to enforce federal
rights located in the Constitution or other statutes.' 29 Thus, § 1983
cases present instances where the existence of a congressionally
created cause of action is not in question; only the validity of the
federal right asserted is at issue. In Blessing, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants violated their federal rights as codified in the
substantial compliance provision of Title IV-D of the Social Security
Act. 130 The Court held that the Social Security Act did not create
federal rights. 13 1 It held that the substantial-compliance provision
''was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial
parents"; rather the provision established "a yardstick for the
Secretary to measure the system wide performance of a State's Title
IV-D program."'132 The plaintiffs' claims were barred, but the Court did
not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as it did in cases such as Shoshone
Mining where the plaintiffs lacked even a colorable claim to a federal
right. Rather, the Court remanded for the entry of summary judgment
33
for the defendants.'
The plaintiffs' case in Blessing, which failed even to establish
an extant federal right, vested under § 1331 because the allegation of
a federal right was at least colorable. It was colorable because the
plaintiffs alleged a substantive right that, while highly dubious, was
not absolutely barred by precedent at the time the case was filed.
Thus, this non-robust allegation of a federal right is all that is
required to vest § 1331 when coupled with an assertion of a
congressionally created cause of action. Again, the analysis here rests
upon the validity of the right asserted, not the origin of the cause of
action.
3. Colorable Claim to a Congressionally Created Right and Causes of
Action Inferred from Federal Statutes
I turn next to cases where the plaintiff lacks an explicit
congressionally created cause of action, but possesses a colorable claim
to a congressionally created right. In an effort to overcome the lack of
a cause of action in such cases, plaintiffs often move the Court to infer

129. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 403-04 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Section 1983
creates no new substantive rights; it merely provides a federal cause of action for the violation of
federal rights that are independently established either in the Federal Constitution or in federal
statutory law." (citation omitted)).
130. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 332-33.
131. Id. at 343.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 338, 349.
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a cause of action from the statute. 134 The federal courts regularly hold
that in such situations the inference, or lack thereof, of a cause of
action is not a jurisdictional question. 135 These cases again illustrate
that in the realm of colorable congressionally created rights, subject
matter jurisdiction rests primarily on the existence of the colorable
claim to a congressionally created right, not on the existence of a
federal cause of action as the Holmes test suggests. Consider the
following two examples.
In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,136 the Court
held that although the Securities Investor Protection Act created
rights for the shareholder plaintiffs, the plaintiffs lacked an explicit
cause of action to enforce them against the federally chartered
Securities Investor Protection Corporation. The plaintiffs sought an
inferred cause of action. The Court held that even though
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the [act] and creating the [Securities Investor
[iut does not
Protection Corporation] was, of course, the protection of investors ....
follow ... that an implied right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in

134. The Court now claims to be on the wagon in regard to inferring causes of action from
statutes. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) ("Having sworn off the habit of
venturing beyond Congress's intent, we will not accept respondents' invitation to have one last
drink."). But the fact-if this is indeed the Court's long-term position, see, e.g., Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (inferring a retaliation cause of action under Title
IX)-that the Court no longer infers causes of action from acts of Congress does not impact the
jurisdictional importance of its previous holdings in this regard.
135. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("It is firmly
established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does
not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case."); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994) ("The
question whether a federal statute creates a claim for relief is not jurisdictional."); Air Courier
Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517, 523 n.3 (1991) ("Whether a cause of action exists is
not a question of jurisdiction, and may be assumed without being decided."); Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 178 (1988) (affirming court of appeals' dismissal under FED. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) because there is no implied private right of action under the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979) (holding existence of implied
cause of action under the Investment Company Act is not jurisdictional); Romero v. Int'l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 359 (1959) ("As frequently happens where jurisdiction
depends on subject matter, the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the
question whether the complaint states a cause of action."); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw.
Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951) (holding existence of implied cause of action under the
Federal Power Act is not jurisdictional); Utah Fuel Co. v. Nat'l Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 306
U.S. 56, 60 (1939) (holding existence of implied cause of action under the Bituminous Coal Act is
not jurisdictional); Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("[Wlhen the
plaintiff bases his cause of action upon an act of Congress jurisdiction cannot be defeated by a
plea denying the merits of this claim.").
136. 421 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1975) (acknowledging that the Securities Investor Protection Act
grants plaintiffs beneficial rights, but questioning whether they have a cause of action to force
the agency to enforce them).
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need of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that
purpose. 137

In lieu of private actions, the Court noted a litany of oversight
procedures that were designed to protect persons similarly situated to
the plaintiffs. 138 As a result, the Court barred the suit, but not on
jurisdictional grounds. Thus, despite its use of the Holmes test,
Barbour demonstrates that the lack of a federal cause of action is not
a jurisdictional defect, further undermining the usefulness of the test.
The Court takes the same jurisdictional stance on inferred
causes of action when it holds that the statute in question does not
create any federal rights. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman,139 for instance, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked
rights under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, and it would not infer a cause of action under the act. The
Court held that the language of the act did not create rights, because
"Congress made clear that the provisions of § 6010 were intended to be
hortatory, not mandatory,"' 40 barring the plaintiffs' action for lack of a
right. Nevertheless, the Court did not hold that the plaintiffs failed to
assert a colorable claim to a right under the statute for jurisdictional
purposes. As a result, the Court never questioned jurisdiction here
even though the claim lacks an independent, congressionally created
cause of action and the plaintiffs' claim to a federal right is merely
colorable. Again, the Court found § 1331 jurisdiction even though it
held that the plaintiffs lacked a federal cause of action, contrary to the
Holmes test.
To sum up so far, the Holmes test (i.e., the notion that § 1331
vests if federal law creates the cause of action) does not track the
Court's actual practice well. As Barbour and Halderman illustrate,
when a plaintiff presents a colorable claim to a congressionally created
right, jurisdiction vests even in the absence of an explicit or inferred
congressionally created cause of action. But, as Shoshone illustrates,
when a plaintiff fails to present a colorable claim to a congressionally
created right, the court will dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, even if Congress created a cause of action. To formulate a
tentative standard, then, § 1331 vests when a plaintiff makes a
colorable allegation of a congressionally created right that is coupled
with an allegation of a congressionally created cause of action-be it
explicitly created or sought by inference. The jurisdictional focus, as

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 421.
Id. at 418-20.
451 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1981).
Id. at 24.
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the Russell & Co. Court held, is placed upon the existence of a
colorable federal right, not the existence of a cause of action.
4. Colorable Rights Created by Treaties
The vesting of jurisdiction in suits to enforce treaty rights
follows this same colorable right standard. Article VI, Clause Two, of
the Constitution establishes that treaties are the supreme law of the
land, and Article III of the Constitution, as well as § 1331, vests the
federal courts with jurisdiction to hear suits arising out of the rights
created by treaties. Despite these straightforward propositions, not
every treaty to which the United States is a party creates federal
rights enforceable in federal courts by private parties. Most
international law, including treaties, is enforceable only by nationstates, not individuals.1 4 1 As such, most claims in federal court
involving a treaty would make the United States a party and therefore
arise under special jurisdictional statutes that are reserved for suits in
which the United States is a party, not under § 1331.142 Nevertheless,
some claims for the vindication of treaty rights do not involve the
United States as a party and, thus, rely upon § 1331 for federal
jurisdiction.
Of prime importance in this area is the Supreme Court's
longstanding distinction between self-executing and non-selfexecuting treaties. 143 A self-executing treaty is one that creates
domestically enforceable rights without the need for Congress to pass
implementing legislation; a non-self-executing treaty, conversely, does
not create domestically enforceable rights without additional
legislative implementation. 144 Treaties coupled with implementing
legislation do not pose a jurisdictional quandary, because the federal
statute implementing the treaty obligations suffices for § 1331

141. See, e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 50 (2001).

142. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345-34 (2000) (granting original jurisdiction to the district courts
where the United States is a party).
143. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v.
Percheman, 37 U.S. 51, 89 (1833); see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 198-211 (2d ed. 1996) (providing a brief discussion of the self-executing doctrine);
Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695,
722-23 (1995) (providing a critical review of the self-executing doctrine).
144. See Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 244 (1984) (finding that
because "the Convention is a self-executing treaty, no domestic legislation is required to give it
the force of law in the United States"); Vazquez, supra note 143, at 696 (distinguishing selfexecuting treaties).
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purposes just like any other federal statute. 145 But treaties that lack
implementing legislation create a unique jurisdictional question.
When a treaty lacks implementing legislation, the federal
courts treat the self-executing status as a jurisdictional issue. If the
treaty is self-executing, then the court will take § 1331 jurisdiction
146 Most
over cases arising out of the rights created by the treaty.
treaties, however, are not self-executing. 147 When a court determines
that a treaty is non-self-executing and that it lacks implementing
legislation, it holds that the case does not arise under § 1331.148
When analyzed from a perspective that focuses upon the
allegation of federal rights, this jurisprudence makes sense. A suit
predicated upon a non-self-executing treaty that lacks accompanying
implementing legislation does not arise under § 1331 because the
treaty is not "given effect as law.' 49 That is to say, in the absence of
implementing legislation, the treaty simply creates no domestic legal
obligations at all. Given that obligations created by treaty are equated
with statutory rights, 150 it is not surprising to see that jurisdictional

145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 111 cmt. h (1987) (stating that "it is the implementing legislation, rather than the [treaty]
itself, that is given effect as law").
146. See, e.g., Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1996) (taking
jurisdiction based on § 1331); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) (same),
disavowed by Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980); Seth v. British Overseas
Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302, 305 (1st Cir. 1964) (same).
147. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) ("Treaties of the United States ... do not generally create rights that are privately
enforceable in courts."); Dreyfus, 534 F.2d at 29 ("It is only when a treaty is self-executing, when
it prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the
enforcement of such rights."); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding, in the absence of specific language in the treaty waiving the sovereign
immunity of the United States, the treaty must be interpreted in accord with the rule that treaty
violations are normally to be redressed outside the courtroom); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that, like private rights under law,
a treaty may confer rights capable of enforcement, but indicating it is not the general rule);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 907 cmt. a

(1987) ("International agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do
not ... provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts .... ").
148. See, e.g., Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir.
1977) (finding that "the Warsaw Convention does not create a cause of action, but merely creates
a presumption of liability if the otherwise applicable substantive law provides a claim for relief
based on the injury alleged"); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir.
1957) (same), abrogated by Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.3d 913, 919 (2d Cir.
1978).
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(3).

150. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (per curiam) (stating that treaties are
on a full parity" with acts of Congress (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality
opinion))); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the constitution, a treaty is
placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation.").
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issues for suits based upon treaty rights are governed by the same
standard as statutory rights. In other words, if a plaintiff asserts a
non-colorable claim to a treaty right where the treaty is non-selfexecuting and lacks implementing legislation, jurisdiction does not
vest under § 1331.
Further, even if a treaty is self-executing, it must create
substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, rights in order for
jurisdiction to vest under § 1331. For example, a suit seeking to
establish paternity and child support, quintessentially state-law
claims, may not be brought under § 1331 by a foreign citizen against a
U.S. citizen, even though the United States and the plaintiffs home
nation entered into a treaty allowing each other's citizens access to
their courts. 15 1 In Buechold v. Ortiz, the Ninth Circuit refused to hear
such a suit on jurisdictional grounds because "the treaty gives access
to the courts," a procedural right, "and does not create a [substantive]
right to child support." 152 In sum, the case holds, contrary to the
Holmes test, that a treaty-created cause of action (i.e., a federal cause
of action) to enforce state-law rights will not arise under § 1331.
Again, the federal courts' treatment of cases predicated upon
the vindication of treaty-created rights follows the jurisdictional
treatment afforded statutory claims. Namely, § 1331 jurisdiction lies
so long as a plaintiff makes a colorable claim to a congressionally
created right (be it found in a statute or a treaty) and the plaintiff
makes some allegation, either explicitly or by inference, of a
congressionally created cause of action (even if the court ultimately
fails to recognize the cause of action). These classes of cases, while
requiring an allegation of a congressionally crafted cause of action,
derive their primary jurisdictional heft from the status of the
congressionally created right that a plaintiff asserts-not the origin of
the cause of action that is the focus of the Holmes test.

151. See Buechold v. Ortiz, 401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968) (affirming the district court's
dismissal based on jurisdictional grounds).
152. Id. at 372; see also Republic of Iraq v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 350 F.2d 645, 647 (7th
Cir. 1965):
In the complaint plaintiff alleges no specific basis of federal question
jurisdiction, but it argued to the district court and here that a federal
question is presented because of a number of treaties between the United
States and the Republic of Iraq and because both nations are signatories of
the United Nations Charter. Plaintiff points to no specific treaty provision,
nor to any in the United Nations Charter, which would require a state court
to recognize an Iraqi guardianship decree.
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5. Congressionally Created Substantial Rights and State-Law Causes
of Action
But § 1331 jurisdiction is not limited to cases where a plaintiff
alleges a congressionally created cause of action. A plaintiffs case may
arise under federal law even though the plaintiff explicitly relies upon
state law to supply the cause of action. These cases fall into two
categories. In the first category-Smith-style cases-federal question
jurisdiction arises over suits alleging state-law causes of action
containing embedded federal issues. In such cases, the primary
jurisdictional factor remains the status of a plaintiffs asserted federal
right, not the origin of the cause of action as the Holmes test directs.
But in these cases, if the plaintiff fails to allege a congressionally
created cause of action, the Court requires that the congressionally
created right the plaintiff asserts be substantial, as compared to the
more lenient colorable standard. 153 In the second category, complete
preemption cases, the defendant upon removal asserts that the
plaintiffs state-law claim is in reality a claim to recover under a
federal statute. Because this is but an odd assertion of a
congressionally created right and a congressionally created cause of
action, the Court defaults to the requirement that the plaintiffs newly
reconstituted federal complaint allege a colorable assertion of a
statutory right in order to satisfy § 1331.
a. Smith-Style Cases
The Court recently revisited statutory Smith-style cases in
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing.154 Here, the IRS seized real property belonging to
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., to satisfy a federal tax deficiency
and sold the property to Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. 155 Five
years later, Grable sued Darue in state court to quiet title, a state law
153. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700 (2006)
(distinguishing the present case from prior cases in which the question qualified as
"substantial"); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005);
Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (holding that the removal statute
"requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be
removed from a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of
ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement."); Chicago v.
Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164 (1997) (requiring substantial right); Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986) (same); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr.
Laborers' Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) (same); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299
U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936) (same).

154. 545 U.S. at 308.
155. Id.
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cause of action. 156 Grable asserted that Darue's title was invalid
because the IRS had conveyed the seizure notice to Grable in violation
of the Internal Revenue Code governing such actions. 157 Upon
removal, the federal district court held, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, that because the plaintiffs state-law cause of action
depended necessarily on a claim of a substantial federal statutory
158
right, jurisdiction under § 1331 was proper.
In its opinion, the Court went to great pains to distinguish the
"substantial" and "serious" claim to a congressionally created right,
which was present in this case, from mere colorable assertions of a
congressionally created right. Indeed, the Court held that having such
a substantial and serious assertion of a federal right is necessary to
establish § 1331 jurisdiction when a state-law cause of action is
asserted. 159 The Court stressed that to be substantial the federal right
at issue must be the central and predominant question in the case,
which it was in Grable & Sons. 60 This need not be the case under the
colorable right standard.1 6' Further, the Court emphasized that the
legal content of the statutory right invoked must be actually contested
by the parties, which was the case in Grable & Sons.1 62 Under the
colorable right standard, however, neither party need contest the legal
content of the right; they need only litigate factual issues related to
the vindication of the federal right. 163 Finally, the Court considered
whether taking jurisdiction in the case comported with congressional
intent regarding the division of labor between the state and federal
courts.' 64 The Court did not undertake this analysis under the
colorable right standard. 165 Thus, under Grable & Sons, when a
156. Id.
157. Id. Grable maintained that the IRS failed to comply with the notice procedures of 26
U.S.C. § 6335(a). Id.
158. Id. at 316.
159. See id. at 313 ("It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal
jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a
serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.").
160. Id.
161. See supra Part II.C ("Often, [the court] holds that a merely 'colorable' federal claim will
arise under § 1331.").
162. Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313.
163. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 5, at 169-74.
164. To be clear, the Court treats the substantial right factor as necessary, but not sufficient,
for finding § 1331 jurisdiction. It also requires a finding that jurisdiction "is consistent with
congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts
governing the application of § 1331." Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 313-14.
165. See supra Part II.C ('That is to say, a right is colorable if it is not merely procedural and
there is at least one interpretation of the federal law alleged, which is not absolutely barred, that
would allow plaintiff to prevail---even if the Court refuses to adopt this interpretation.").
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plaintiff asserts a state-law cause of action to enforce a
congressionally created right, the Court will take § 1331 jurisdiction
only if the plaintiff alleges a substantial and contested congressionally
created right and taking jurisdiction in that particular case comports
with congressional intent.166
The Court applied a similar analysis in the oft-cited Gully v.
First National Bank 167 case but found jurisdiction lacking. In Gully, a
national banking association conveyed all its assets to the First
National Bank in Meridian in exchange for First National's promise to
pay all the banking association's debts. 168 One of these debts was an
overdue state tax. 169 First National failed to pay the tax and Mr.
Gully, the Mississippi state tax collector, sued for breach of contract, a
state-law cause of action. 170 First National sought removal to federal
court on the theory that a federal statute allowed Mississippi to tax
the national bank association's shares in the first instance, thus
raising § 1331 jurisdiction under the Smith test.1 7 1 The Supreme
Court disagreed.172 It held that although federal law granted
Mississippi permission to tax, the tax collector's right to collect this
particular debt was entirely a function of state law.173 Which is to say,
the plaintiff did not assert a substantial claim to a federal right. The
Court explained that under the Smith test, mere federal permission
does not create jurisdiction because the federal "right or immunity...
must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiffs cause of
action."'174 The Court went on to state that "a suit does not so arise
[under § 1331] unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a
law, upon the determination of which the result depends."'175 Federal
permission to tax, in effect, failed to create a federal right central to
the litigation of which the parties were contesting the legal content.
While the Court's jurisdictional analysis in these cases is a
rigorous investigation of the status of the federal right asserted (not

166. 545 U.S. at 308 ("Such federal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue,
but a substantial one. And the jurisdiction must be consistent with congressional
judgment ... ").
167. 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936).
168. Id. at 111.
169. Id. at 112.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 114.

173. Id. at 115-16.
174. Id. at 112.
175. Id. at 114.
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the origin of the cause of action as the Holmes test advises), it is the
coupling of the asserted federal right with a state-law cause of action
that triggers this more probing jurisdictional review. If the plaintiff in
Gully had sought an inferred cause of action from a federal statute,
the Court undoubtedly would have assumed jurisdiction. In Gully, the
federal act that failed to create rights for the plaintiff was essentially
the same as the federal statutory scheme in Halderman, which also
failed to create rights for the Halderman plaintiff. 176 Unlike Gully,
however, the Court in Haldermanfound § 1331 jurisdiction. 177 The key
difference was that the plaintiff in Halderman did not rely upon a
state-law cause of action but rather asserted, unsuccessfully, an
inferred federal statutory cause of action. 178 As Grable & Sons and
Gully illustrate, the Court requires more in terms of the viability of
the federal right at issue when the plaintiff relies on state law to
provide the cause of action. 179 Meeting this standard requires that the
federal right asserted be substantial and that the vesting of
jurisdiction in any particular case comport with congressional intent.
Again, this scheme, which takes jurisdiction over state-law causes of
action, simply does not comport with the Holmes test.
b. Complete Preemption
Claims finding their way into the federal courts by way of
"complete preemption" receive a different jurisdictional treatment
than Smith-style cases, even though, in both instances, a plaintiff
initially alleges a state-law cause of action. 80 This again illustrates
that the origin of the cause of action is not the predominant
jurisdictional determinate under § 1331. Preemption doctrine falls

176. 451 U.S. 1, 11 (1981).
177. Id. at 32.
178. Id. at 17.
179. See Freer, supra note 7, at 333-36 (discussing the Court's heightened substantiality
requirements for Smith-style cases).
180. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987) (treating issue of complete
preemption as jurisdictional); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1987) (same);
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1983)
(same); Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 339 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (defendant
failed to show that claim was completely preempted by ERISA and thus removal was improper
since plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint did not present federal question), vacated, 542 U.S. 933
(2004); Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 130 (2d Cir. 2003)
(similar); see also Karen A. Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A Legal Process
Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927, 962-64 (1996) (providing a critical review of complete
preemption doctrine); Mary P. Twitchell, CharacterizingFederal Claims: Preemption, Removal,
and the Arising-Under Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 832-34
(1986) (same).
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into two categories.1 8 1 "Normal" preemption doctrine governs cases
where the defendant presents a federal defense to the plaintiffs statelaw claim.18 2 Because the federal issue arises as a defense in a normal
preemption case, § 1331 jurisdiction does not lie pursuant to the wellpleaded complaint rule.18 3 "Complete" preemption cases, however,
present a more complicated jurisdictional puzzle.
In a complete preemption case, a defendant is not merely
presenting a federal defense to a state-law claim. Rather, a defendant
asserts that Congress has so occupied this area of law that the
plaintiff does not legally present a state-law claim, even though the
complaint asserts one, and that the only possible interpretation of the
plaintiffs claim is one based on federal law.18 4 Complete preemption
doctrine, then, is but a species of statutory interpretation; Congress
can direct, either explicitly18 5 or by inference,186 when federal law
18 7
provides the exclusive cause of action in particular fields.
Jurisdictionally speaking, if the court holds that the cause of action is
completely preempted, then the case arises under § 1331
jurisdiction. 8 8 Moreover, because complete preemption is a function of
statutory construction of congressional acts, the courts construe a
plaintiffs reconstituted complaint as if it presents a claim to a
colorable federal right.18 9 That is to say, for jurisdictional purposes the

181. Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 63.
182. Id.
183. Id. ("Federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiffs suit. As a
defense, it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not
authorize removal to federal court.").
184. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) ("When the federal
statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope
of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law.");
Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 63-64 ("Congress may so completely pre-empt a particular area that
any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.").
185. See Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 6 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) of the PriceAnderson Act).
186. See id. (holding that the National Banking Act preempts state-law usury claims against
national banks); Metro. Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 62 (holding that ERISA preempts state-law claims
of improper allocation of benefits from employee benefit plans); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390
U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (holding that the LMRA preempts breach of contract claims regarding union
agreements with employers).
187. Beneficial Natl Bank, 539 U.S. at 8.
188. See id. ("When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a
claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law,
is in reality based on federal law.").
189. Cf. Twitchell, supra note 180, at 865 (describing a limited substantive analysis
approach).
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federal courts employ the same colorable right standard that they use
when a plaintiff directly files a claim under a federal statute. 190
In reviewing the cases in which a plaintiff invokes an act of
Congress or a treaty as the foundation for § 1331 jurisdiction, the
Court's overarching focus falls upon the concept of federal right, not
federal cause of action as premised by the Holmes test. The following
two rules restate the precedents from these cases. If a plaintiff alleges
a congressionally created cause of action-by direct statutory
command, by inference, or by complete preemption-then § 1331
jurisdiction lies if the plaintiff makes a colorable assertion of a
congressionally created right. 191 If a plaintiff alleges a state-lawcreated cause of action, then § 1331 jurisdiction lies if the plaintiff
makes a substantial claim to a congressionally created right, coupled
with a determination that vesting jurisdiction in this particular case
92
squares with congressional intent.
B. ConstitutionallyProtectedRights
In considering jurisdiction over constitutional cases, the Court
focuses, just as with the statutory cases previously discussed, on the
right asserted-not on the cause of action as the Holmes test suggests.
Indeed, the Court employs the same jurisdictional standards in the
constitutional context as it does in statutory cases.193 Namely,
plaintiffs need only make a colorable claim to a constitutional right
when they also allege either a statutory cause of action or a cause of
action inferred directly from the Constitution. 194 Only in the case
where the plaintiff explicitly relies upon a state-law cause of action
must the plaintiff allege a substantial right. 195 As in the previous
Section, I proceed by reviewing the Court's § 1331 cases in terms of
the strength of the constitutional right and the type of cause of action
asserted in three differing combinations.

190. See Oakley, supra note 7, at 1845 ("But complete preemption is better understood as an
integral part of the general principles governing the existence of ordinary Category-I jurisdiction
over a claim that, in the final analysis, exists only as a creature of federal law.").
191. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 8.
192. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 8.
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1. Non-Colorable Assertion of Constitutionally Protected Rights
I begin with non-colorable assertions of constitutionally
protected rights. The Supreme Court in the oft-cited case, Bell v.
Hood,196 held that that "where the complaint ... is so drawn as to seek
recovery directly under the Constitution ... the federal court ... must
entertain the suit."197 That is to say, the high Court held that the
federal courts have original jurisdiction to hear all claims arising
directly under the Constitution. 19 Despite this strong language, a
separate line of the Court's cases denies that subject matter
jurisdiction always lies for suits arising directly under the
Constitution. 19 9 1 contend that such exceptions to the Bell rule are best
understood as failures to assert colorable federal rights-not as
failures to assert a federal cause of action.
Many of these cases, but not all, form the core of the political
question doctrine, which has vexed scholars for years. 20 0 I do not
20 1
intend to forward a theory of the political question doctrine here.
For the purposes of this jurisdictional discussion, one need only note
that once the Court has held that the case raises a political questionwhether this is because the plaintiff is not an intended beneficiary of
the constitutional clause at issue or because it is beyond the
competency of the judiciary to enforce the clause-the Court dismisses
the case on jurisdictional grounds. Moreover, the courts
jurisdictionally dismiss such cases even when Congress has provided a
statutory cause of action, which again is contrary to a straightforward
application of the Holmes test.
The Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government Clause is
perhaps the most (in)famous source of law over which the Court has
applied the political question doctrine. 20 2 The Constitution states that
196. 327 U.S. 678, 678 (1946).
197. Id. at 681-82.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (jurisdictionally dismissing claim
for failing to allege a judicially cognizable right).
200. See Martin Redish, JudicialReview and the Political Question, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031,
1031 (1985) ("The doctrine has always proven to be an enigma to commentators. Not only have
they disagreed about its wisdom and validity (which is to be expected), but they have also
differed significantly over the doctrine's scope and rationale.").
201. See id. at 1032 (reviewing "prudential" theories and "textualist" theories of the

doctrine); see also Jesse Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1457, 1469-71 (2005) (arguing that judicial ability to fashion coherent tests should be the
guide for the application of the political question doctrine).
202. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-29 (1962) (holding that plaintiff lacks a cause of
action to sue directly under the guarantee of a republican form of government clause of the
Constitution and that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as a result); Pacific States Tel.
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the "United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government." 20 3 The seminal case interpreting
this clause is Luther v. Borden,20 4 which followed the Dorr rebellion of
1842 against the so-called charter government of Rhode Island. The
Court declined to adjudicate whether the charter government violated
the Republican Form of Government Clause. 20 5 Rather, it held that
"the argument on the part of the plaintiff turned upon political rights
and political questions," which were not properly answered in a
20 6
federal court.
Reinterpreted in terms of colorable rights, the question
presented required the Court to determine the rights of the polity, as
opposed to the individual rights of the litigants at bar. The Court's
reluctance to define the polity's rights explains why the Court held
that the judiciary lacked subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the
case. 207 That is, the Court held that neither party to the litigation was
obliged to guarantee a republican form of government to the plaintiff,
and that even if that obligation was extant the Court could not impose
a remedy. 20 8 Thus, the parties lacked both the obligation and
enforceability elements of the contemporary conception of a right,
20 9
rendering the alleged federal right non-colorable.
& Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140-51 (1912) (same); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,
46-47 (1849) (declining to adjudicate a claim based on the guarantee of a republican form of
government clause).
203. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
204. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
205. Id. at 47.
206. Id. at 46.
207. Id. at 47.
208. See id. at 39, 42:
In forming the constitutions of the different States, after the Declaration of
Independence, and in the various changes and alterations which have since
been made, the political department has always determined whether the
proposed constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the
State, and the judicial power has followed its decision....
[T]he Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided for an
emergency of this kind, and authorized the general government to interfere
in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated the subject as political in its
nature, and placed the power in the hands of that department.... Under this
article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government
is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each
State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what
government is established in the State before it can determine whether it is
republican or not.
209. See supra Part II.C (providing the test for whether a right is colorable). Again, I make
no claims as to why there is no claim to a colorable right here. Perhaps this lack of a right is a
function of plaintiff not being an intended beneficiary of the clause at issue or perhaps it was
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Of course, Luther, an 1849 case, predates the 1875 general
grant of federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, the case was originally
brought in a federal circuit court under diversity jurisdiction to
enforce a trespass tort, and the analysis the Court employed is of a
constitutional, not statutory, nature. 210 Nevertheless, the Court has
often relied on this same political-question rationale to dismiss
jurisdictionally suits arising under § 1331.211 In Nixon v. United
States, 2 12 for example, the Senate impeached a federal district court
judge. In so doing, the Senate heard evidence in committee instead of
in a meeting of the full Senate. The impeached judge brought suit
alleging that this method of hearing evidence violated the Senate's
constitutional duty to try impeachment cases. 21 3 The Court held this
claim non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. 214 Because
the plaintiff failed to allege judicially cognizable rights (i.e., the
plaintiff presented a non-colorable claim to a constitutional right), the
21 5
claim was jurisdictionally dismissed.
Jurisdictional dismissals for failing to assert a colorable claim
to a constitutionally protected right are not limited to instances of the
political question doctrine. For example, the Court held that it lacks
jurisdiction to hear claims directly under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution. 216 This is the case, the Court ruled,
because the Clause does not create substantive rights but rather
provides a rule of decision (i.e., a procedural rule) for state and federal

beyond the competency of the judiciary to enforce the clause. See Redish, supra note 200, at
1039-57 (critiquing competing justifications for the political question doctrine). Whatever the
reason for finding plaintiff lacks a colorable right, the key issue for this Article is that such a
ruling results in a jurisdictional dismissal.
210. Luther, 48 U.S. at 34.
211. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding claim non-justiciable
under political question doctrine).
212. Id. at 224.
213. Id. at 288 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6).
214. Id. at 226 ("[B]efore we reach the merits of such a claim, we must decide whether it is
'justiciable,' that is, whether it is a claim that may be resolved by the courts. We conclude that it
is not.").
215. Id. at 237. Although the Nixon Court fails to state the grounds for the dismissal of the
case, it is blackletter law that a dismissal under the political question doctrine is jurisdictional.
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) ([T]he
concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal
courts by the 'case or controversy' requirement of Art. III, embodies ... [the] political question
doctrine a ... [Indeed] the presence of a political question suffices to prevent the power of the
federal judiciary from being invoked by the complaining party.); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 732 n.3 (1972) ("Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. III federal courts to... resolve
political questions.").
216. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988); Minnesota v. N. Secs. Co., 194 U.S.
48, 72 (1904).
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courts. 217 The Court has taken a similar approach to claims brought to
enforce the Supremacy Clause, even when Congress has provided a
cause of action by statute. 218 In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
21 9
Organization,
a case where 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provided a statutory
cause of action, the Court held that an assertion of a violation of the
Supremacy Clause stapding alone was insufficient to vest federal
question jurisdiction. As the Court noted, the "Clause is not a source of
any federal rights," but rather a choice of law rule for cases of conflict
between state and federal law. 220 Again, these cases demonstrate that
a plaintiffs lack of a colorable assertion of a constitutionally protected
right, not the origin of the cause of action as the Holmes test states,
forms the linchpin to the Court's jurisdictional ruling.
Finally, this focus upon the assertion of a colorable,
constitutionally protected right is supported in instances in which the
Court recognizes a right where it held previously that one did not
exist. For example, in the old case of Kentucky v. Dennison,221 the
Court held that the Extradition Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution did not vest state governors with a right to enforce
judicially an extradition request against other states because the
constitutional command installed merely a "moral duty" to do so. 222 As
a result, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear such cases,
given that the plaintiff did not present a colorable claim to a
constitutionally protected right (i.e., the plaintiff was not legally owed
a duty that the courts could enforce). 223 In 1987, the Court reversed
itself.224 It held that the extradition clause created a clear ministerial
duty that it could enforce, and thus took jurisdiction. 225 Simply put,
217. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182-83:
Rather, the Clause only prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state,
are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to
the faith and credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of a State other than that in which the court is sitting.
218. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612-15 (1979) (holding no
federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging
violation of Supremacy Clause); Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1144-45
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff does not have a cause of action directly under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a result).
219. 441 U.S. at 600.
220. Id. at 613.
221. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 230
(1987).
222. Id. at 108-09.
223. Id. at 110.
224. Branstad,483 U.S. at 230.
225. Id. at 226-29.
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the Court now holds that the Extradition Clause creates federal
rights, thereby sustaining § 1331 jurisdiction. 226 Importantly, it was a
change in the status of the right asserted, not a change in the origin of
the cause of action that rendered the jurisdictional change. 227 The
Holmes test does not account for changing jurisdictional treatments
such as this.
In reviewing these cases in which plaintiffs fail to present a
colorable claim to a constitutionally protected right, the following rule
can be synthesized: the Court lacks jurisdiction over non-colorable
claims to constitutional rights regardless of whether a cause of action
is created by federal law, contrary to the basic tenets of the Holmes
test.
2. Colorable Assertion of Constitutionally Protected Rights
Just as with statutory rights, jurisdiction over colorable claims
to constitutionally protected rights depends primarily upon the status
of the right asserted, not the origin of the cause of action. First, if a
plaintiff presents a winning claim to a constitutionally protected right
and asserts a congressionally created cause of action, the federal
courts have § 1331 jurisdiction. Any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that states
a viable constitutional right fits this bill. 228 Of more interest here are
suits that ultimately fail to establish a constitutionally protected right
but in which the plaintiff manages to assert a colorable allegation to
constitutional protection and asserts a congressionally created cause
229
of action.
Just such a fact pattern arose in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc.230 Here plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, which caps liability for
federally licensed nuclear power plant operators at $560 million
should a nuclear accident occur. 23 1 The plaintiffs sought declaratory
judgment, 232 thus employing a federal statutory cause of action. 233 The
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005) (holding, in a § 1983 case, that
the California penal system violated the Fourteenth Amendment by temporarily segregating
prisoners by race).
229. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (holding
plaintiff failed to present a due process claim without questioning jurisdiction in a § 1983 case).
230. 438 U.S. 59, 93-94 (1978).
231. Id. at 84.
232. Id. at 67.
233. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (granting to the courts of the United States the authority to
declare the rights of any interested party).

20081

A UNIFIED THEORY

1709

plaintiffs asserted that the substantive due process provisions of the
Fifth Amendment ran contrary to this liability cap. 234 The Court
disagreed, holding that the Fifth Amendment does not impart such a
right to the plaintiffs. 235 Even though the Court held that there was no
such right, it held this assertion of "constitutional rights is
236
sufficiently ...colorable to sustain jurisdiction under § 1331(a)."
The rule expressed here, which is the same rule applied to statutory
claims, can be restated as: where Congress has created a cause of
action, a plaintiff need only present a colorable claim to a
constitutionally protected right for jurisdiction to lie under § 1331.
The Court takes the same approach to colorable claims of
constitutionally protected rights when the cause of action is to be
inferred directly from the Constitution. The cases are legion in which
the Court holds that the lack of a cause of action to bring suit under
the Constitution does not raise a jurisdictional defect. 237 The leading
case in this regard is Bell v. Hood.238 In Bell, the plaintiffs brought
suit against several FBI agents for illegal arrest, false imprisonment,
and unlawful searches and seizures. 23 9 The plaintiffs asserted that
these acts violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and asked the
240
court to infer a cause of action directly from the Constitution itself.
The Court assumed, based upon the complaint, that the plaintiffs
alleged viable constitutional violations. 241 The only question for the
Court was whether it had jurisdiction to infer a cause of action for
monetary damages. 242 The Court held that it did, stating that "where
the complaint ...is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the
Constitution ... the federal court ...
must entertain the suit"
regardless of whether the cause of action is actually inferred at the

234. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 69 n.12.
235. Id. at 83.
236. Id. at 72.
237. See, e.g., id. at 71-72 (holding existence of implied cause of action directly under the
Constitution is not a jurisdictional question); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (holding existence of implied cause of action directly under the Constitution
is not a jurisdictional question); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 649 (1963) (same); Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (same); Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th
Cir. 2005) (holding plaintiff lacked a Bivens cause of action but reversing the district court's
jurisdictional treatment of this defect), rev'd in part, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(reversing the substantive, but not the jurisdictional, opinion of the panel), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 664.
238. 327 U.S. at 682-83.
239. Id. at 679.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 683.
242. Id. at 684.
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end of the day. 243 Indeed, it held that the taking of jurisdiction
necessarily occurred prior to the question of whether to infer a cause
of action. 244 This holding, which decouples jurisdiction from the cause
of action, runs contrary to the Holmes test, which focuses the
jurisdictional question upon the origin of the cause of action. 245 The
Court then specifically reserved the question of whether to infer such
a cause of action-thus it illustrated that the status of a cause of
action was not the key jurisdictional factor so long as a colorable
246
federal right has been alleged by the plaintiff.
The Court takes the same tack when plaintiffs ask it to infer a
cause of action directly from the Constitution even when the Court is
unwilling to assume that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were
violated. In Wheeldin v. Wheeler,247 for example, the plaintiff alleged
that the chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee
signed a blank subpoena to appear before the committee and that an
investigator employed by the committee filled in plaintiffs name in
order to disgrace him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court first noted that the plaintiff lacked a statutory cause of
action. 248 The Court further held that the Fourth Amendment was not
violated, and it would not infer a cause of action. 249 Nevertheless,
citing Bell, the Court took jurisdiction over the claim on the ground
that the plaintiffs unsuccessful assertion of a constitutional right was
250
colorable.
In sum, when a colorable constitutional right is asserted, the
Court vests § 1331 jurisdiction under the colorable right standard.
Under this standard, § 1331 jurisdiction lies if a plaintiff asserts a
colorable claim to a constitutionally protected right, coupled with an
allegation of a statutory or a constitutionally inferred cause of action.
The Holmes test's emphasis on the origin of the cause of action fails to
offer an explanatory thesis for these cases.

243. Id. at 681-82.
244. Id. at 682 ("The reason for this is that the court must assume jurisdiction to decide
whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief as well as to
determine issues of fact arising in the controversy.").
245. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Holmes test).
246. Bell, 327 U.S. at 684.
247. 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963).
248. Id. at 650.
249. Id. at 649.
250. Id.
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3. Constitutionally Protected Rights and State Law Causes of Action
As with statutory rights, in Smith-type constitutional cases,
the level of viability of a plaintiffs alleged constitutional right
required by the court is heightened when the origin of the cause of
action lies in state law. Here, the Court requires that the assertion of
a constitutionally protected right be substantial as compared to the
25 1
more common colorable standard.
The leading case in this line is Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co. 252 In Smith, a stockholder sued in federal court to enjoin his
corporation from purchasing bonds issued pursuant to the Federal
Farm Loan Act. 253 The plaintiffs theory of the case was that such a
purchase constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, a state-law cause of
action, because the corporation could only purchase bonds "authorized
to be issued by a valid law" and that the Federal Farm Loan Act was
unconstitutional. 254 Although the plaintiff pursued a state-law cause
of action, the Court held that "where it appears from the bill or
statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the
construction or application of the Constitution ... , and that such
federal claim is not merely colorable,... the District Court has
255
jurisdiction under this provision."
In so doing, the Court held that a plaintiff could avail himself
of a federal forum on a state-law theory of recovery without being
diverse from the defendant as long as the plaintiffs state cause of
the
the court to determine
required
necessarily
action
256
Reinterpreted as a function of
constitutionality of a federal act.
rights and causes of action, the Court held that the plaintiff alleged a
federal right (i.e., a clear, mandatory obligation that the courts can
enforce) to be free of congressional regulation beyond its Commerce
Clause authority. 257 Moreover, the plaintiff alleged a substantial right,
251. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) (requiring
that the right be more than "merely colorable").
252. Id.; see also Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 659-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (taking jurisdiction
over a state law claim of abuse of process that involved "the body of federal law authorizing and
defining the issuance of federal legislative process"); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 319-22
(1936) (taking jurisdiction over a state law fiduciary duty case that presented an embedded
constitutional challenge to a corporate purchase of electricity from the TVA).
253. Smith, 255 U.S. at 195.
254. Id. at 198.
255. Id. at 199.
256. See id. at 199-201.
257. Id. at 200-01. There is some question here as to whether the plaintiff in Smith is
asserting a right in the contemporary sense in which I employ the term in this Article. The
plaintiff here contended that Congress violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution by
passing the Federal Farm Loan Act, which was "beyond the constitutional power of Congress."
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because the parties were actually contesting the legal content of the
right and the alleged right was the central issue in the case. 258
In reviewing the cases in which a plaintiff claims a
constitutionally protected right as the foundation for § 1331
jurisdiction, the Court's overarching focus is on the concept of right,
contrary to the crux of the Holmes test. As with statutory actions, two
standards apply. If a plaintiff alleges a federal cause of action, either
by direct statutory command or by inference from the Constitution,
then § 1331 jurisdiction lies as long as the plaintiff makes a colorable
allegation to a constitutionally protected right. If a plaintiff alleges a
state-law cause of action, then § 1331 jurisdiction lies only if the
plaintiff makes a substantial allegation of a constitutionally protected
right.
C. Federal Common Law Rights
Although the predominant scholarly view assumes that federal
common law cases satisfy § 1331 under the Holmes test,259 the Court's
opinions demonstrate that, in fact, suits seeking to protect "pure"
federal common law rights are governed by a different jurisdictional
scheme than is used when a plaintiff asserts statutory or

Id. at 195. In a sense, it is odd to see a plaintiff asserting a violation of the Commerce Clause by
Congress as a violation of a right. Nevertheless, the federal courts will hear defenses to civil and
criminal prosecutions that are grounded upon the right of the defendant not to be subjected to
federal legislation that is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause with regularity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (upholding civil defendant's argument that
the Violence Against Women Act's civil penalties provision was beyond the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (upholding criminal
defendant's argument that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was beyond the scope of Congress's
Commerce Clause powers). When employing the Commerce Clause as a defense, the defendant
necessarily asserts that Congress owes the defendant a clear and mandatory duty and that the
courts have the ability to afford relief (i.e., the defendant asserts a right grounded in the
Commerce Clause). See supra Part II.B (discussing elements of a right). The oddity of a plaintiff,
as opposed to a defendant, asserting these rights is, I contend, more a function of standing
doctrine, which limits who can be a plaintiff in a case even if the wronged party is a right holder,
than the capacity of the Commerce Clause to create rights. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (discussing standing doctrine). Given that the Court does not
generally recognize taxpayer standing, see Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2553, 2559 (2007), it would seem that most potential Commerce Clause plaintiffs lack an injuryin-fact, which is necessary for constitutional standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. The plaintiff
in Smith, by contrast, due to the unusual set of facts lodging the Commerce Clause claim within
a corporate fiduciary duty claim appears to be the exception to the general trend regarding
standing.
258. See Smith, 255 U.S. at 199; see also supra Part II.C (discussing substantial rights).
259. See supra note 16 (outlining the standard academic view).

2008]

A UNIFIED THEORY

1713

constitutional rights. 260 I begin by finding that in practice the Court
makes a jurisdictional distinction between "statutory" federal common
law cases, suits where the Court fashions federal common law
pursuant to a statutory imperative to do so, and "pure" federal
common law cases, suits where the Court creates federal common law
with no statutory permission. The Court analyzes statutory federal
common law cases within § 1331's ambit under the lenient colorable
right standard. On the other hand, the federal courts require plaintiffs
seeking to ground § 1331 jurisdiction on a pure federal common law
claim to plead not only a substantial right but facts sufficient to justify
26 1
the assertion of such a right (i.e., plaintiffs must assert a claim).
There is much debate as to what actually constitutes federal
263
common law. 262 While there are at least three views on the subject, I
will employ the most common view 264 in my discussion. Pursuant to
260. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (treating federal common
law cases as a different category than either the Holmes or Smith tests for satisfying § 1331).
261. See supra Part II.B (defining "claim").
262. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 Nw.
U. L. REV. 585, 590-94 (2006) (discussing three definitions of federal common law).
263. Id. The narrowest view finds that federal common law is merely a listing of those
enclaves where the Court has employed the use of federal common law in the past. Id. On the
broad side, federal common law is thought by some to include "any rule of federal law created by
a court ... when the substance of that rule is not clearly suggested by federal enactmentsconstitutional or congressional." Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common
Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1986) (emphasis omitted). This broad view would encompass
many actions, such as inferring causes of actions from statutes or the Constitution, often not
traditionally considered components of federal common law. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note
262, at 591-94. Such a view of federal common law would play havoc with the reinterpretation of
§ 1331 doctrine I have presented here. Indeed, when taken to its logical conclusion, this broad
view finds no meaningful distinction between federal common law and other judicial acts of
interstitial lawmaking. See Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 807
(1989); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980):
The difference between 'common law' and 'statutory interpretation' is a
difference in emphasis rather than a difference in kind. The more definite
and explicit the prevailing legislative policy, the more likely a court will
describe its lawmaking as statutory interpretation; the less precise and less
explicit the perceived legislative policy, the more likely a court will speak of
common law. The distinction, however, is entirely one of degree.
Thus, at least for this jurisdictional project the expansive view is inappropriate because the
Court does appear to differentiate between statutory/constitutional claims (i.e., those involving
interpretation) and federal common law cases (i.e., those employing legislative authority).
Compare supra Part III.A, and Part III.B, with infra Part III.C. Further, regardless of whether it
makes sense, the courts continually assert that inferring a cause of action from a statute or the
Constitution is different from creating federal common law. See, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v.
Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) ("But the authority to construe a statute is
fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy
which Congress has decided not to adopt.").
264. Tidmarsh & Murray, supranote 262, at 591.
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this standard view, federal common law denotes "federal rules of
decision whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional commands." 265
Importantly, federal common law cases can be divided into two
categories. 266 I label the first category "statutory federal common law."
In statutory federal common law suits, the federal courts are creating
federal common law at Congress's statutory command. 267 Such is the
case, for example, under the Labor Management Relations Act 268 and
the Sherman Act. 269 The uniting theme for the second category of
federal common law is the lack of a statutory directive to create
common law. 270 I label this set of doctrines "pure federal common law."
The importance of this distinction for the purposes of this discussion
lies in the differing jurisdictional treatment the Court applies to
statutory and pure federal common law cases. I begin with statutory
federal common law suits.
1. Statutory Federal Common Law
Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials27 1 provides a strong
example of the Court's jurisdictional treatment of statutory federal
common law cases. In Texas Industries, the plaintiff brought a civil
antitrust action alleging a conspiracy to set the price of concrete in the
265. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 685 (5th ed. 2003).
266. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). Some might even
argue for a third grouping. The Court, at times, labels the creation of substantive rules that are
required to fill an interstice of a congressionally created cause of action as an act of making
federal common law. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 97 (1991)
("Because the ICA is a federal statute, any common law rule necessary to effectuate a private
cause of action under that statute is necessarily federal in character." (citing Burks v. Lasker,
441 U.S. 471, 476-77 (1979); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942))). I
believe this is better classified as an act of statutory interpretation. In any event, because
instances like Kamen necessarily involve a federal statute that creates a right and a cause of
action, it is not surprising that these cases tend to follow the colorable right standard.
267. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 642 ("Federal common law also may come into play when
Congress has vested jurisdiction in the federal courts and empowered them to create governing
rules of law.").
268. See id. at 642-43 (discussing the power vested in courts by the Labor Management
Relations Act); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957)
(finding statutory authorization to "fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of'
collective bargaining agreements).
269. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (finding that
Congress intended courts to "give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on commonlaw tradition").
270. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640-41 (discussing federal common law absent explicit
congressional authorization).
271. Id. at 640-43.
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New Orleans area. 272 The defendant then filed a third-party complaint
against alleged coconspirators in an effort to recover contribution for
the payment of a judgment. 273 Although the text of the Sherman Act
does not establish a right to contribution for antitrust defendants, the
third-party plaintiff in Texas Industries requested that the Supreme
Court create one as a matter of federal common law. 274 The Court held
that Congress had, as a general matter, directed it to create federal
common law emanating from the Sherman Act. 27 5 Nevertheless, the
Court refused to create a contribution right,276 affirming the district
277
court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.
This approach is now familiar. The third-party plaintiff had a
statutory basis, although attenuated,2 78 for claiming a federal rightin this case a right to contribution. 279 The Court dismissed on the
merits, as opposed to jurisdictionally, because the third-party plaintiff
made a nonfrivolous allegation of a federal right.280 Thus, the Texas
Industries Court applied the colorable right standard in taking § 1331
jurisdiction in this statutory federal common law case. Indeed, the
Court generally applies the colorable right standard, thereby taking
§ 1331 jurisdiction whenever it declines to fashion statutory federal
common law rights. 281 The Court's practice in this area is readily
summed up as follows: when hearing statutory federal common law
claims, the federal courts take § 1331 jurisdiction pursuant to the
colorable right standard.

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 633.
See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978):
Congress, however, did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate
the full meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The
legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts to give
shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.
279. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 639-40.
280. Id. at 647.
281. See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 (1981) (holding that
the judiciary was not authorized to create a right of contribution for an employer that was liable
for discriminating against employees in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act); see also Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. IADA Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 862, 867-68
(8th Cir. 2007) (taking § 1331 jurisdiction under a complete preemption theory, dismissing on the
merits, and holding no federal common law right to contribution exists under ERISA); Coker v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 579, 584-86 (7th Cir. 1999) (taking § 1331 jurisdiction
under a complete preemption theory, dismissing on the merits, and holding no federal common
law right to promissory estoppel exists under ERISA).
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2. Pure Federal Common Law
Pure federal common law claims, suits in which the courts lack
a statutory directive to create common law, can arise under § 1331 as
well. 28 2 For example, the rights and obligations of the United States,
which are governed by federal common law, can apply in cases in
which the United States is not a party, and thus arise under § 1331.283
Interstate controversies, which are governed by federal common law,
can arise in a suit that does not feature two states litigating directly
against each other and thus arise under § 1331.284 Finally, plaintiffs
may seek to enforce a right created by the federal common law of

282. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (concluding that "§ 1331
jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law"). Pure federal common law
cases fall roughly into six categories. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 262, at 594. These
categories are: (1) cases affecting the rights and obligations of the United States, see, e.g.,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (involving "[t]he rights and duties
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues"); (2) cases involving interstate
controversies, see, e.g., Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 518-19 (1936) (involving Oregon's
diversion of the Walla Walla River to the alleged detriment of the residents of Washington); (3)
cases that call upon the court to make substantive judgments regarding international relations,
see, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (involving contract for
the purchase of Cuban sugar between American and newly nationalized Cuban companies and
the act of state doctrine); (4) cases arising in admiralty, see, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510
U.S. 443, 445 (1994) (involving personal injury action brought by seaman injured on the job); (5)
cases creating federal defenses to state-law claims, see, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 502 (1988) (creating a federal contractor defense for state-law design defect claims
brought against munitions manufactures); and (6) cases where the Erie doctrine requires the
adoption of a federal rule of decision, see, e.g., Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 499 (2001) (involving preclusive effect of federal dismissal of state-law claims). Many of
these groupings are inapposite to this discussion as Congress granted separate jurisdictional
authority to hear such claims. For example, cases affecting the rights and obligations of the
United States typically feature the United States as a party, which take jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1345-47, 1491 (2000). Interstate controversies, which typically feature two or more
states suing each other, arise under the Supreme Court's exclusive and original jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1251(a). Most admiralty cases arise under § 1333. Federal defenses to state law
causes of action, because the federal issue is not in conformity with the well-pleaded complaint
rule, do not arise under § 1331. See Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won't Die: The Legacy of
Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 685, 703-09 (2006) (discussing federal
contractor defense, and the well-pleaded complaint rule, as well as the possibility that such cases
could come into federal court, absent diversity, under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). Finally, the
creation of a substantive rule of decision under the Erie doctrine, by definition, must arise under
diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
283. See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 682 (2006)
(involving the proper forum for reimbursement claims when injured federal employee recovers
medical expenses, paid by insurer, from a third party).
284. See, e.g., Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 93 (involving action brought by the state of Illinois
against four Wisconsin cities and two sewerage commissions).
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foreign relations and use § 1331 as the basis for federal jurisdiction. 28 5
Because my interest in these cases is jurisdictional, not substantive,
the discussion that follows will focus first upon pure federal common
law claims that seek the creation of a federal cause of action along
with the federal right and second upon pure federal common law
claims that employ a state-law cause of action along with the alleged
federal common law right. I contend that the Holmes test fails to
capture the Court's practice in either of these categories.
a. Pure Federal Common Law Rights and Federal Causes of Action
Many pure federal common law cases call upon the federal
court to fashion both a federal right and a federal cause of action.
Given that the plaintiff in such cases is asserting a federal cause of
action, one might suspect that jurisdiction would easily lie under the
Holmes test.28 6 Or one might also suspect that jurisdiction would vest
upon the assertion of a colorable federal common law right, just as in
the statutory federal common law suits reviewed above. The Court,
however, uses a different jurisdictional analysis for pure federal
common law claims that are coupled with an allegation of a federal
cause of action.
The Court's opinion in Empire HealthchoiceAssurance, Inc. v.
McVeigh 28 7 is illustrative of this unique jurisdictional standard. In this
case, the Court dismissed a putative pure federal common law claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 8 The plaintiff, a private
administrator of a health insurance plan for federal employees, sued
an insured's estate for reimbursement of benefits paid after the
insured's estate won a state-law tort suit. 28 9 The insurer argued that
federal common law should govern its claim and thereby secure § 1331
jurisdiction. The Court disagreed and refused to fashion a federal
common law rule. 290 In so doing, the Court reaffirmed its long-held
rule that it will create pure federal common law only when the issue
at hand is uniquely federal and the application of state law would
create a significant conflict with an identifiable federal policy or

285. Cf. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 471 (2003) (presenting defendant
corporation's argument for removal to federal court based on the proposition that "the federal
common law of foreign relations provided federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331").
286. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-51
(1985) (invoking the Holmes test in a federal common law of Indian relations case).
287. 547 U.S. at 681.
288. Id. at 692-93, 701.
289. Id. at 682.
290. Id. at 692-94.
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interest. 291 Despite the allegations in the complaint that these two
elements were met, the Court held that the plaintiffs failure to meet
this test with a "showing" that these two elements were met created a
292
jurisdictional defect.
This restrictive jurisdictional dismissal is stunning in many
respects. To start, the opinion does not comport with the Holmes test.
The Holmes test focuses solely on the allegation of a federal cause of
action. 293 The plaintiff here nonfrivolously alleged a federal cause of
action, which should be sufficient to satisfy the Holmes test.294 Yet the
Court declined to take § 1331 jurisdiction. 295 Focusing on the Holmes
test as the default jurisdictional test simply fails to capture the
Court's actual practice in pure federal common law cases such as
these.
The McVeigh Court, moreover, required much more of the
plaintiff than the assertion of a colorable or substantial federal right
in order to take jurisdiction. It held that jurisdiction would not lie
unless the plaintiff made an actual showing, as opposed to a
nonfrivolous assertion, that unique federal concerns were at issue and
the application of state law would constitute a significant conflict with
federal policy. 296 This holding is quite extraordinary as it runs directly
contrary to the blackletter rule that "[j]urisdiction ... is not defeated
...by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of
action on which petitioners could actually recover." 297 Neither the
299
colorable right standard 298 nor the substantial right standard
requires plaintiffs to make an actual showing that the federal right
will vest in order to ground § 1331 jurisdiction.
Indeed, if either standard had been applied to the McVeigh
plaintiffs claim to a federal common law right, § 1331 jurisdiction
291. Id. at 692-93.
292. Id. at 688 (reviewing the lower court's decision, and noting that "federal jurisdiction
exists over this dispute only if federal common law governs Empire's claims ... courts may
create federal common law only when the operation of state law would (1) significantly] conflict
with (2) uniquely federal interest[s]" (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
293. See supra Part II.A.
294. Id.
295. McVeigh, 547 U.S. at 701.
296. Id. at 693 ("Unless and until that showing is made, there is no cause to displace state
law, much less to lodge this case in federal court.").
297. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
298. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978)
(finding that, although there were no such constitutional rights as alleged by the plaintiff, a
claim to such "constitutional rights is sufficiently... colorable to sustain jurisdiction under
§ 1331(a)").
299. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 213 (1921) (presenting
case where plaintiff loses his constitutional challenge).
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would have vested. The insurance company's assertion of a federal
common law right was colorable because there was at least one
interpretation of the federal law alleged, which was not absolutely
barred, that would have allowed plaintiff to prevail (viz., the creation
of a federal common law right to reimbursement which had up to this
point not been barred). 30 0 Indeed, the assertion was far from frivolous
because a strong argument was made, one that convinced four
members of the Court, that federal common law should have
controlled the case. 30 1 The assertion of a federal common law right in
this instance appears to satisfy the substantial standard as well. The
claim to a federal common law right was certainly a serious
contention; 30 2 it was the central issue in the case and the parties were
30 3
contesting the legal content of the right.
The Court, instead of relying upon the plaintiffs allegation of a
substantial federal right to vest jurisdiction, required the plaintiff to
make a showing that the operation of state law would significantly
conflict with uniquely federal interests.3 0 4 In fact, the court's holding
300. See supraPart II.C (discussing colorable rights).
301. See McVeigh, 547 U.S. at 706 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, Souter & Alito,
JJ.) ("It seems clear to me that the petitioner's claim arises under federal common law. The
dispute concerns the application of terms in a federal contract. This Court has consistently held
that 'obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts are governed exclusively
by federal law.' " (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988))); Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 150 (2d Cir. 2005) (Sack, J., concurring):
Empire has made a substantial showing that the first part of the Boyle test
has been met because this case implicates 'uniquely federal interests,' in
providing uniform healthcare coverage for federal employees and in
decreasing the administrative costs associated with such insurance. It may
well be that, as in Boyle, 'the interests of the United States will be directly
affected,' by the outcome of this litigation and of litigation like it.
(citations omitted), aff'd, 547 U.S. 677 (2006); Empire, 396 F.3d at 151 (Raggi, J., dissenting):
The court today rules that this dispute cannot be heard in federal court for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, it rejects Empire's argument
that the case arises under federal common law, concluding that Empire fails
to satisfy the 'significant conflict' prong of the test established in Boyle v.
United Technologies. I respectfully disagree.
(citations omitted).
302. Empire, 396 F.3d at 155 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (concluding that "federal common law
does govern the parties' dispute in this case").
303. See supra Part II.C (discussing elements of a substantial right). Whether taking
jurisdiction would have comported with congressional intent, the third element of the substantial
assertion test, is more difficult to determine here. But there is certainly an argument to be had.
The insurance company plaintiff was the administrator of a federal employee health insurance
plan. Thus, any reimbursement it received would have indirectly benefited the government by
reducing premiums. Given the unique relationship here between the plaintiff and the federal
government there is at least an argument that the courts should assume congressional intent to
take jurisdiction here.
304. McVeigh, 547 U.S. at 692-93.
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that the plaintiff failed to make a showing of a right, as opposed to an
inability to assert a colorable or substantial right, normally would only
be grounds for a successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion, not a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion. 30 5 The McVeigh Court's jurisdictional holding thus is quite
restrictive of claims to pure federal common law rights when coupled
with an assertion of a federal cause of action. Further, McVeigh's
restrictive jurisdictional approach is not an isolated one. Several
courts of appeals have applied this approach to federal interest
common law cases 306 and federal common law of interstate
307
controversies cases.

305. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) ("It is firmly
established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate the case."); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476 n.5 (1979) ("The question whether a
cause of action exists is not a question of jurisdiction, and therefore may be assumed without
being decided."); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71-72 (1978)
("[I]t is enough for present purposes that the claimed cause of action to vindicate appellees'
constitutional rights is sufficiently substantial and colorable to sustain jurisdiction under
§ 1331(a)." (citation omitted)); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
249 (1951) (finding "the question whether jurisdiction exists has been confused with the question
whether the complaint states a cause of action"); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228
U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("[W]hen the plaintiff bases his cause of action upon an act of Congress
jurisdiction cannot be defeated by a plea denying the merits of this claim."); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198-200 (1962) (discussing the fundamental difference between a dismissal
on the merits and a jurisdictional dismissal); Ehm v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 732 F.2d 1250,
1257 (5th Cir. 1984):
A dismissal under both rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) has a "fatal inconsistency"
and cannot stand. "Federal jurisdiction is not so ambidextrous as to permit a
district court to dismiss a suit for want of jurisdiction with one hand and to
decide the merits with the other. A federal district court concluding lack of
jurisdiction should apply its brakes, cease and desist the proceedings, and
shun advisory opinions. To do otherwise would be in defiance of its
jurisdictional fealty."
(internal citation omitted); Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32-33 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that
dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and for failure to state a claim are analytically distinct,
implicating different legal principles and different burdens of proof); John Birch Soc'y v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 377 F.2d 194, 197 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967) (affirming only on FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)
grounds when the district court dismissed the case on the grounds of a failure to state a claim
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction because "[tihe dismissal of these actions on jurisdictional
grounds should not be construed to imply affirmance of the substantive grounds for dismissal
adopted by the District Court"); cf. Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 364 (1st Cir.
2001) ("It is pellucid that a trial court's approach to a Rule 12(b)(1) motion which asserts a
factual challenge is quite different from its approach to a motion for summary judgment." (citing

Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1990); Kamen v. AT&T
Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986))).
306. See, e.g., Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that plaintiff does not have a cause of action under federal common law of navigable
waters and that court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as a result); Frank v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
128 F.3d 919, 923-24 (5th Cir. 1997) (jurisdictionally dismissing federal common law breach of
contract claim because no such federal right exists); City of Huntsville v. City of Madison, 24
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The key to understanding the McVeigh line of federal common
law cases as contrasted with the Texas Industries line of statutory
federal common law cases, I contend, is that in the latter instanceswhere the Court has applied the more lenient colorable right
standard-the Court had a statutory directive to begin its commonlaw-making endeavor. 30 8 In pure federal common law cases, such as
McVeigh, where there is not a federal statute directing the courts to
create common law, the federal courts tend to follow the restrictive
McVeigh approach to jurisdiction, requiring the plaintiff to make an
actual showing of a federal common law right in order to sustain
jurisdiction.3 0 9 These weaker indicia of congressional intent in pure
federal common law cases, as I will expound upon in Part IV, justify
the imposition of a more restrictive jurisdictional test.
b. Pure Federal Common Law and State-Law Causes of Action
Pure federal common law rights may also arise in a Smith-style
setting where state law provides the cause of action.3 10 For instance,
federal common law of foreign relations suits often arise in this
F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming jurisdictional dismissal because the court failed to
recognize a federal common law right regarding contractual rights of third party beneficiaries).
307. See United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming
jurisdictional dismissal because federal common law of interstate controversies did not govern);
Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Energy Dev. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 833, 836-38 (S.D. W. Va. 2004)
(dismissing suit jurisdictionally for failing to make a showing that the federal common law of
nuisance would apply); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007) (holding that assertion of a federal common law right to nuisance not sufficient to
vest § 1331 jurisdiction). But see New York v. DeLyser, 759 F. Supp. 982, 986-87 (W.D.N.Y.
1991) (dismissing federal common law of nuisance on FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) grounds). There is
little case law on point that is of use to my project. The only cases that would be of use to this
project are those where: (1) the plaintiffs only claim to federal jurisdiction lies with § 1331; (2)
the only foundation for § 1331 jurisdiction lies with an assertion of federal common law of
interstate controversies; and (3) the court dismisses the action. The only Supreme Court case to
match this fact pattern is City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The Court in
Milwaukee held that the Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972 displaced federal
common law, which was the sole asserted ground for jurisdiction. Id. at 317. Frustratingly, after
holding that the federal common law was displaced, the Court remanded without directing a
procedural posture. Id. at 332. The Seventh Circuit on remand held, inter alia, that while federal
common law no longer grounded the claims, the claims could proceed (if appropriately pleaded)
under the Federal Water Pollution Act, thereby preserving § 1331 jurisdiction. Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984). Thus, no answer to my particular question is
forthcoming from the Milwaukee case. Furthermore, the courts of appeals are not awash in these
cases. Thus, data set for this particular claim is especially small, and thus my conclusions should
be appropriately limited by the small set of data that supports them.
308. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.630, 639-40 (1981).
309. See supra notes 306-07.
310. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110
(1938) (applying federal common law of interstate controversies).
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procedural posture.3 1 ' Given the allegation of a state-law cause of
action, one might expect the federal courts to apply the substantialright standard as the jurisdictional test in these federal common law
cases in order to create symmetry with suits bringing statutory and
312
constitutional rights coupled with state-law causes of action.
Contrary to this expectation, the federal courts require the more
rigorous assertion of a substantial right and the presentation of
sufficient factual allegations in order to take § 1331 jurisdiction.
As in McVeigh, when the federal courts do not find a showing of
a pure federal common law right that is coupled with a state-law
cause of action, they dismiss on jurisdictional grounds.3 1 3 In issuing
these jurisdictional dismissals, the courts frequently assert, in line
with Smith-style cases involving statutory and constitutional claims,
that jurisdiction requires the presentation of a substantial federal
right.3 1 4 Nevertheless, these courts use the term "substantial"
differently than it is used when plaintiffs bring statutory and
constitutional claims. Recall that the term substantial, as used in the
constitutional and statutory context, means that the right at issue is
311. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964); Republic of
Venezuela v. Philip Morris, Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Patrickson v. Dole Food Co.,
251 F.3d 795, 799-805 (9th Cir. 2001); Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377-78
(11th Cir. 1998); Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated
on other grounds, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
526 U.S. 574 (1999); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1997);
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1986); In re World War I Era
Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942-44 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Sequihua v. Texaco,
Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525, 53132 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1355-57
(E.D. Tex. 1993). Such claims can also arise as a defense to a state law claim. See, e.g., Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (taking jurisdiction on certiorari from the Oregon Supreme
Court regarding federal common law of foreign relations as a defense and holding an Oregon
probate law void, even in the absence of federal legislative or executive action, because it may
adversely affect the power of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs); Aquafaith
Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding federal common law of
foreign relations raised as a defense insufficient for a finding of federal question jurisdiction). In
some rare instances customary international common law, which is a species of federal common
law of foreign relations, creates both a right and a cause of action. See The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 714 (1900) (holding plaintiffs could recover under international common law the value
of their fishing ships seized by the U.S. Navy during a time of war).
312. See supraParts III.A.5.a, III.B.3.
313. See, e.g., Venezuela, 287 F.3d at 199 (deciding in the context of seeking a writ of
mandamus to reverse district court's jurisdictional remand); Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798
(deciding in the context of defendant's request for removal to federal court); Pacheco de Perez,
139 F.3d at 1371-72 (deciding in the context of plaintiffs appeal of removal); Marathon Oil, 115
F.3d at 320 (deciding in the context of defendants request for removal).
314. See, e.g., Patrickson,251 F.3d at 799 (employing the term "essential"); Pacheco de Perez,
139 F.3d at 1377 (employing the term "substantial"); Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320 (same);
Torres, 113 F.3d at 542 (same); Marcos, 806 F.2d at 353 (employing the term "important").
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more than merely colorable, it must be central to the litigation and its
legal content must be contested by the parties. 315 In federal common
law cases where the plaintiff relies upon a state-law cause of action,
however, the courts equate the assertion of a substantial right with
the making of a showing that the case falls within the scope of the
316
right.
Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas A. G.317 is illustrative of this more
rigorous jurisdictional approach. In this case, the defendant, in
support of removal, asserted that the plaintiffs state-law cause of
action raised a substantial issue of federal law governed by the federal
common law of foreign relations. 318 The defendant relied upon circuit
precedent, 3 19 which held that the federal common law of foreign
relations governed suits in which a foreign nation that was not a party
to the suit asserted that the case struck at the nation's vital economic
and sovereign interests. In Marathon Oil, Germany certified that the
suit did strike at its vital economic and sovereign interests. 320 The
court affirmed that this understanding of the federal common law of
foreign relations remained the law in the Fifth Circuit; that this
question was central to the litigation; and, as was obvious, that the
parties contested the legal content of the right. 321 Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit dismissed the claim on jurisdictional grounds because it
found the factual allegations regarding the alleged economic and
sovereign interests did not truly represent vital interests to
Germany. 3 22 That is, the court jurisdictionally dismissed the case for a
failure to make a factual showing, rather than merely an assertion,
that the federal common law right should apply. Once again, this
holding runs contrary to the rule that the veracity of averments in the
complaint has no jurisdictional import. 323 Nevertheless, this rulethat § 1331 jurisdiction in Smith-style federal common law cases rests
upon the assertion of a substantial right and the presentation of

315. See supra Parts III.A.5.a, JII.B.3; see also supra notes 180-92 and accompanying text
(discussing federal preemption of state law claims).
316. See, e.g., Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 799-804; Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1377;
Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320.
317. 115 F.3d at 320.
318. Id.
319. Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1997).
320. Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 320.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
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sufficient factual allegations-is the consistently applied rule in
32 4
federal common law of foreign relations cases.
This restrictive jurisdictional test is not limited to foreign
relations cases. For example, in National Audubon Society v.
Department of Water,325 the Ninth Circuit, in a Smith-style case, was
called upon to determine whether the federal common law of
interstate controversies would apply to a suit seeking to prevent the
diversion of water from a California lake to Los Angeles. The court
found that the plaintiff pleaded at least a colorable, and most likely a
substantial, assertion of a federal common law right. 326 Nevertheless,
the court held that the plaintiff "failed to demonstrate" that the
federal common law right would apply under this particular set of
facts. 327 Further, it held that this failure to demonstrate the
applicability of the right was a jurisdictional defect. 328 In effect, the
court required the plaintiff to make a showing that the federal
329
common law was applicable in order to vest § 1331 jurisdiction.
Federal common law cases, then, are governed under two
standards. If the federal court has a statutory mandate to create
common law, then the lenient colorable right standard applies. If the
federal court constructs common law without statutory permission,
the courts apply a unique and ultra-restrictive test. The plaintiffs
must present both an allegation of a substantial federal right and
make a sufficient showing that the federal right applies. The Holmes
test, with its myopic focus on the origin of the cause of action, offers no
help here in developing a principled distinction between statutory and
pure federal common law cases such as McVeigh. In both instances,
324. See, e.g., Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 799-804 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no
federal jurisdiction even though state law causes of action implicated federal common law of
foreign relations); Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1377 (11th Cir. 1998) (same);
Marathon Oil Co., 115 F.3d at 320 (same).
325. 869 F.2d 1196, 1200-05 (9th Cir. 1988).
326. Id. at 1203 ("We acknowledge that in the context of an interstate water pollution case,
the Supreme Court stated that federal courts do fashion federal laws where federal rights are
involved and that there is a federal common law when dealing with air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects.").
327. Id. at 1204.
328. Id. at 1205.
329. There are cases holding to the contrary, in which the court takes jurisdiction without a
showing that the pure federal common law right applies. See, e.g., Herero People's Reparations
Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that the court has
jurisdiction to hear a claim that "federal common law should provide a private cause of action for
violations of customary international law" even though "this circuit has not embraced the idea");
Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the failure to recognize a federal common law right should result in a dismissal under FED.
R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6), not 12(b)(1)). Yet, the weight of the practice, as the text above demonstrates,
is to apply the restrictive showing standard.
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the plaintiffs alleged federal causes of action, which should be
sufficient to take § 1331 jurisdiction under that approach.
In closing this reinterpretation of the § 1331 canon, I have
attempted to shed light upon the Court's § 1331 doctrine by
reinterpreting this body of case law in terms of the contemporary
notions of right and cause of action. In so doing, I conclude that,
despite many references over the years to the importance of the
33 0
Holmes test with its emphasis upon the origin of the cause of action,
3
31
the existence of a federal cause of action is neither a necessary nor
sufficient 332 condition for the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction. Rather the
primary determinate for the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction is the status
of the federal right asserted. The somewhat forgotten opinion of People
of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. best reflects this reinterpretation of the
§ 1331 doctrine: "The federal nature of the right to be established is
'333 The origin
decisive, not the source of the authority to establish it.
of a plaintiffs cause of action under this analysis remains important
only insofar as it determines the strength with which the federal right
must be asserted.
Pursuant to this recharacterization, the Court's § 1331 doctrine
may be captured by three distinct standards-as compared to the
predominant view's two-that afford more precise application than
references to kaleidoscopic common sense 334 or the Holmes test. Under
the first standard, § 1331 jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff makes a
colorable assertion of a federal statutory, constitutional, or treaty
right coupled with an assertion of a nonjudicially created federal cause
330. The classic presentation of the Holmes test was made in 1916. Am. Well Works Co. v.
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (finding a "suit arises under the law
that creates the cause of action"). A Westlaw search for citations to the "headnote" corresponding
to this quote returns 381 citations.
331. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310
(2005) (finding lack of a federal cause of action to try claims of title to land obtained at a federal
tax sale did not preclude removal to federal court of a state action with non-diverse parties
raising a disputed issue of federal title law); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 202 (1921) (finding federal jurisdiction existed in a stockholder's state action to enjoin a
trust company from investing its funds in farm loan bonds given that the constitutional validity
of the statute under which the bonds were issued was in dispute).
332. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 603 (1979) (finding
federal jurisdiction did not encompass a claim that a state welfare regulation was invalid
because it was in conflict with the Social Security Act); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S.
505, 507 (1900).
333. 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933) (finding a suit brought in support of an adverse claim to a mine
under an act of Congress did not confer federal jurisdiction).
334. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936) ("To define
broadly and in the abstract 'a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States'
has hazards of a kindred order. What is needed is something of that common-sense
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscope situations ....
").
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of action. Under the second standard, § 1331 jurisdiction lies when a
plaintiff makes a substantial assertion of a federal statutory or
constitutional right coupled with a state-law cause of action, as long as
the vesting of jurisdiction in any particular instance comports with
congressional intent. Finally, under the third standard, § 1331
jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff makes a substantial assertion of a
pure federal common law right and a cause of action, coupled with a
showing supporting the application of the federal common law right.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND

§ 1331

The recharacterization of the § 1331 canon presented above not
only yields a series of clarity-enhancing jurisdictional standards, but
also presents a principle unifying these three standards. This unified
balancing principle asserts that § 1331 jurisdiction is best understood
as a function of the viability of the federal right that the plaintiff
asserts balanced against other indicia of congressional intent that the
plaintiffs particular claim should be heard in the federal courts.
Under this analysis, congressional creation of a statutory cause of
action for a particular right constitutes strong evidence of
congressional intent that such rights may be vindicated in the federal
courts. These two components-the federal right and cause of actionwork in a teeter-totter manner in relation to congressional intent.
That is to say, when there are other strong indicia of congressional
intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction such as the existence of a statutory
cause of action, the plaintiffs assertion of a federal right may be quite
weak. Conversely, when there are few other congressional indicia of
an intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a
stronger allegation of a federal right in order for § 1331 jurisdiction to
lie.
I turn next to a discussion of this unified balancing principle.
First, I address the policy supporting this principle's focus upon
legislative intent. Second, I argue that this unified balancing principle
offers a coherent explanation for the application of the three
jurisdictional standards synthesized in Part III to one statutory grant
of federal question jurisdiction. The unified balancing principle, thus,
rejects both "truths" forwarded by the predominant view of § 1331
jurisdiction (i.e., that § 1331 jurisdiction lacks a focus upon legislative
intent and is internally inconsistent).
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A. ConstitutionalNorm of CongressionalIntent
A focus upon congressional intent for the vesting of statutory
jurisdiction over the lower federal courts is rooted deeply in separation
of powers doctrine. Indeed, absent some argument on the periphery,
most jurists and scholars agree that the jurisdiction granted by Article
III of the Constitution is not self-executing and that Congress retains
near plenary power to vest the lower federal courts with as much or as
little of that Article III power as it sees fit. 335 Thus, the lower federal
courts require a statutory grant of jurisdiction to hear any case,
including a federal question case.3 36 Moreover, federal question
jurisdiction "masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system."337 Congress, however, is a preeminent actor in
resolving federalism questions, 338 at least in regard to the intersection

335. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 83 (2d ed., The Michie Company 1990) (1980) (stating that federal courts can

hear cases only if the Constitution has authorized courts to hear such cases and Congress has
vested that power in federal courts); Friedman, supra note 12, at 2 ("[C]ommentators mark out
their individual lines defining the precise scope of Congress's authority, but no one has
challenged the central assumption that Congress bears primary responsibility for defining
federal court jurisdiction."); Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 241 (1999) ("For both constitutional and institutional
reasons, the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is jealously guarded by its Article III
keepers."); id. at 250-51 ("[T]he jurisdiction of the lower federal courts does not flow directly
from Article III; rather, the jurisdictional grants of Article III must be first affirmed by
statute . . . . Congress-let alone the separation of powers-might be doubly offended by the
unauthorized exercise of judicial power."); James Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where
There's a Remedy, There's a Right: A Skeptic's Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV.
215, 277 (2004) ("[T]he jurisdiction of the lower courts is a matter of legislative discretion and not
of 'need' defined from Article III."); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations
on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25
(1981) ("Courts and commentators agree that Congress' discretion in granting jurisdiction to the
lower federal courts implies that those courts take jurisdiction from Congress and not from
article III."); see also supra note 11.
336. See sources cited supra note 335 (discussing how Congress retains power to vest the
lower federal courts with as much or as little of the federal jurisdiction that is granted by Article
III).
337. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8
(1983); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (finding
"determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional
intent, judicial power, and the federal system").
338. The classic example of so-called process federalism is Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National
Powers Vis-&-vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557
(1977) (arguing that the national political system protects states' interests in Congress and that
the federal courts should focus on individual rights); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as

a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001) (arguing that the separation of
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of federalism and the control of the federal courts' jurisdiction. 339
Given this special competency, a course that sails a closer tack to
congressional intent in the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction than the
predominant view 340 would foster foundational separation of powers
norms.
But as the reinterpretation of the Court's jurisdictional
doctrine above illustrates, plaintiffs must make further allegations of
congressional intent to vest federal question jurisdiction than merely
pointing to traditional tools of statutory construction. Indeed, if § 1331
were read as encompassing the full scope of the Article III font of
authority, as many have suggested was the intent of the 1875
Congress, 341 federal question jurisdiction could well swallow many
suits that are traditionally considered exclusive state-court
powers doctrine protects states' interests in Congress by rendering the passage of federal
legislation difficult); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (arguing that political parties adequately
represent states' interests in Congress); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV,and Interstate
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1476 (2007) ("[Alssigning Congress primary control over
interstate relations accords with precedent, federalism values, functional concerns, and
history."); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalismand Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 2030-32
(2003):
Congress can draw on its distinctive capacity democratically to elicit and
articulate the nation's evolving constitutional aspirations when it enforces
the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of the institutionally specific ways that
Congress can negotiate conflict and build consensus, it can enact statutes
that are comprehensive and redistributive, and so vindicate constitutional
values in ways that courts cannot.
Of course, process federalism has its critics. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2001)
(arguing that process federalism does not adequately protect states' interests and thus the
federal courts must play an active role in regard); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine:
Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1733, 1815-44 (2005) (arguing that the federal courts have a primary role to play in questions of
federalism doctrine).
339. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1969) (arguing that the Constitution places
the power to "expand the jurisdiction of [the lower federal] courts... specifically... in the
Congress, not in the courts"); Mishkin, supra note 5, at 159 ("[It is desirable that Congress be
competent to bring to an initial national forum all cases in which the vindication of federal policy
may be at stake."); Resnik, supra note 20, at 1007 ("Rather than naturalizing a set of problems
as intrinsically and always 'federal [questions for jurisdictional purposes],' I urge an
understanding of 'the federal' as (almost) whatever Congress deems to be in need of national
attention, be it kidnapping, alcohol consumption, bank robbery, fraud, or nondiscrimination.").
340. See supra note 11 (discussing the predominant view of § 1331 federal question
jurisdiction).
341. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 n.8 (legislative history indicates Congress
may have meant to confer all jurisdiction that the Constitution allows); 2 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874)
(statement of Sen. Carpenter) (equating the statutory and constitutional grants of federal
question jurisdiction); Friedman, supra note 12, at 21 (same); Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy
History of Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 723 (1986) (same).
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territory. 342 But such an approach would run afoul of fundamental
federalism principles, which the Court imputes to Congress as a
default legislative intention. 343 If, however, legislative intent is to be
the guide for the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction, some clear answer to
the very basic question of where plaintiffs may file their complaintsstate court, federal court, or both-must be forthcoming. 344 The
answer I offer to this question is that the courts may find these extra
indicia of congressional intent by way of the plaintiffs allegation of
federal rights and causes of action.
Under this view, then, Congress controls federal question
jurisdiction not only by creating jurisdictional statutes, such as
§ 1331, but also by creating rights and causes of action. 345 Each
component, the right and the cause of action, lends strength to a
342. See Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (holding a case arises
under federal law for purposes of Article III if federal law "forms an ingredient of the original
cause"). But see Anthony J. Bellia, The Origins of Article III "arisingunder" Jurisdiction, 57
DUKE L.J. 263, 264 (2007) (arguing that in light of English jurisdictional principles, the Osborn
Court interpreted Article III "arising under" to mean that a federal court could hear cases in
which a federal law was determinative of a right asserted in the proceeding before it). Bellia's
reading would very much limit the scope of Article III to those cases I argue pertain to § 1331.
343. The Court's treatment of preemption cases expresses this sentiment well. Here the
starting point for analyzing the preemptive effect of any federal law that operates "in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied" is with a presumption against preemption. Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996) (observing "we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt statelaw causes of action").
344. See Felix Frankfurter, Distributionof Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 506 (1928) ("[Ihe proper allocation of authority between United
States and state courts is but part of the perennial concern over the wise distribution of power
between the states and the nation."); Friedman, supra note 14, at 1216 ("A central task of the
law of federal jurisdiction is allocating cases between state and federal courts."); cf. Deborah J.
Merritt, Federalism as Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 553-54 (1995) ("[W]e cannot empower
two levels of government without offering some rule for mediating differences between them.").
345. Cf. Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdictionand Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 676 (2005)
[hereinafter Wasserman, Merits] (presenting a similar two-step approach to jurisdictional
questions, arguing that "]urisdictional grants empower courts to hear and resolve cases brought
before them by parties; substantive causes of action grant parties permission to bring those cases
before the court"); see also Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction,Merits, and Non-Extant Rights
28 (Fla. Int'l Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-01, 2007), available at
http://works.bepress.com/howardwasserman/4 [hereinafter Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights]:
The reach and scope of federal judicial activity and influence can be
constrained both by jurisdiction stripping and by the non-existence as law of
rights and duties. Both produce the apparently same effect-fewer successful
actions will be brought in federal court to vindicate individual federal rights,
arguably depriving courts of the opportunity to perform their central and
essential constitutional function.
As Professor Wasserman explains, the decision to "strip" a jurisdictional statute or limit rights
has numerous practical differences. Wasserman, Non-Extant Rights, supra, at 29-44. However,
for the narrower purposes of this Article, which focus just on the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction,
those issues are not as pressing.
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plaintiffs assertion that congressional intent supports taking
jurisdiction in a given case. Thus, congressional creation of rights, in
most cases, 346 constitutes strong evidence of legislative intent to vest
the federal courts with § 1331 jurisdiction over suits seeking to
vindicate such rights. This determination of legislative intent to vest
follows from the creation of rights because Congress both intends that
its clearly stated, mandatory obligations will be enforced, and it
legislates against a historical backdrop in which the federal courts
have been essential to the enforcement of such federal rights. 347 In
fact, the notion that the creation of statutory rights expresses a
legislative intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction is so strong that many
scholars have noted that the creation of a federal right concomitantly

346. Congress can create rights without vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction. For
instance, several courts have noted that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2000), vests jurisdiction exclusively in the state courts, pursuant to clear congressional
command. See Murphey v. Lanier, 204 F.3d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (listing cases in support
of this proposition). However, such acts are exceptional. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2000)
(limiting most Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claims to state court).
347. See, e.g., Federal Farmer XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 315 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("It is true, the laws are made by the legislature;
but the judges and juries, in their interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a
very extensive influence for preserving or destroying liberty, and for changing the nature of the
government."); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal
Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1397 (1953) ("Remember the Federalist
papers. Were the framers wholly mistaken in thinking that, as a matter of the hard facts of
power, a government needs courts to vindicate its decisions?"); id. at 1372-73 (discussing the role
of enforcement courts and the constitutional constraints that come into play when Congress
confers jurisdiction to enforce federal law); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation
Doctrine,97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 712 n.163 (1997) ("[A]ny effort to pare back federal jurisdiction
would deny Congress an important and historically effective forum for the implementation of its
laws."); Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1611 (2000) ("Congress generally cannot ensure
enforcement of its legislative mandates without providing a federal judicial forum where
violators of those mandates can be prosecuted."). Of course this raises the issue of the so-called
"parity" debate between the federal and state courts. The crux of this debate has been to
determine which system, state or federal, better protects federal rights. I need not dip into this
debate, as it is likely incapable of non-normative resolution. See Brett C. Gerry, ParityRevisited:
An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 237 (1999) (noting that the
question "whether state courts are doing a good job of interpreting the Federal Constitution...
inevitably lead[s] to a conclusion influenced by the normative preconceptions of the person who
poses the query"). I need only assert that it makes sense to interpret Congress as generally
preferring a federal forum for the protection of federal rights. Congress's preference may have no
factual foundation, but the lack of a foundation for Congress's intent is neither here nor there
when one is focusing upon congressional intent as it is the constitutional empowered actor here.
See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise:Rethinking the TripartiteMantra of Federal
Question Jurisdiction,CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.comabstract=l162329
(arguing that there is no factual basis to believe that the state courts are less likely to enforce
federal rights than are the federal courts).
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creates § 1331 jurisdiction. 348 An allegation of a congressionally
created cause of action is also strong evidence that Congress desires
that cases of that type be heard in federal court. This determination of
legislative intent follows from the creation of a cause of action because
this amounts to a finding that Congress has determined the plaintiff is
"an appropriate party to invoke the power of the [federal] courts" in
349
the matter at hand.
Of course, the opposite is also true. If Congress has not created
a right, then § 1331 jurisdiction will not vest, absent the existence of
federal constitutional or common law. Thus, if Congress wishes to
forestall the federal courts from taking a stand on an issue, it is not
required to actively reign in the judicial branch by positive legislation
or jurisdiction stripping; it need only refrain from passing federal
legislation in that arena. The default position, then, is that § 1331
jurisdiction does not lie, 350 which helps to preserve exclusive statecourt jurisdiction over such questions. This principle of preservation of
351
exclusive state-court jurisdiction, in turn, fosters federalism values.
Furthermore, looking for congressional intent by way of rights and
causes of action avoids the critique that a congressional intent model
of § 1331 is static and thus incapable of accounting for the changing
roles of the federal and state courts since 1875.352 That is, this
reconceptualization allows Congress to retain dynamic control over
which cases vest in the federal courts without wholesale reformation
of the text of § 1331 itself through the creation of rights and causes of
action.

348. See Wasserman, Merits, supra note 345, at 677-78 ('The significance of statutory
general federal question jurisdiction is that when Congress enacts a substantive law, federal
district courts immediately and necessarily attain jurisdiction to hear claims under that statute,
without Congress having to do anything more."). Of course, this only follows when one discusses
statutory, not constitutional, federal question jurisdiction. If there were not a well established
series of lower federal courts, such a presumption may well be unsound.
349. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
350. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (holding
§ 1331 jurisdiction is presumed not to exist in a suit to enforce a settlement agreement).
351. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National
Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J 1003, 1004 (2003)
(discussing the value of judicial federalism and the role of state courts in resisting national
tyranny); James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism:Power and Interpretation in
State ConstitutionalLaw, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1746-60 (2003) (same).
352. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing the need for an approach to federal
jurisdiction that is "flexible enough to take into account changing conceptions of the roles" of
various courts).
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B. Three Instantiationsof One Principle
The unified balancing principle, with its focus on legislative
intent, also offers a strong explanatory thesis that reconciles the
Court's use of three competing standards to vest one statutory grant of
jurisdiction. Namely, as other indicia of congressional intent to vest
the federal courts with federal question jurisdiction decrease, the
Court becomes more demanding of the plaintiffs assertion of a federal
right. I review these three standards in turn.
Consider first the use of the colorable right standard in the
context of legislatively created rights and causes of action. When a
plaintiff makes an allegation of a congressionally created cause of
action, the plaintiffs allegations of a federal right need only be
colorable to vest under § 1331. 3 5 3 That is to say, the strong indication
of congressional permission to invoke the power of the federal court, as
exemplified by the assertion of a congressionally created cause of
action, need only be coupled with a weak allegation of a federal right
in order for the federal court to find sufficient congressional intent to
vest the action under § 1331. This analysis remains the same even
when the cause of action is supplied by inference from a statute,
because the question of whether to infer a cause of action remains one
of legislative intent. 354 Actions to enforce treaty rights similarly look to

353. See supra Parts III.A.1-3, III.A.5.a (discussing plaintiffs colorable allegations of a
federal right).
354. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("The judicial task is to interpret
the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a
private right but also a private remedy); Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102
(1991) (finding that "recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal statute must
ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy"); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 n.9 (1986) (listing cases that emphasize the role of legislative
intent in the judiciary's inquiry into whether a private right of action exists); Daily Income Fund,
Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 535-36 (1984) ("In evaluating such a claim, our focus must be on the
intent of Congress when it enacted the statute in question."); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981) ("The key to the inquiry is the intent of the
Legislature."); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) ("Our focus,
as it is in any case involving the implication of a right of action, is on the intent of Congress.");
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) ("[Tlhe ultimate issue is whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action."); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of
Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981) (same); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
15 (1979) ("The question whether a statute creates a cause of action, either expressly or by
implication, is basically a matter of statutory construction."); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) ('The question of the existence of a statutory cause of action is, of
course, one of statutory construction."). Commentators also regularly note that this separation of
powers issue governs the inference of causes of action from statutes. See, e.g., Richard W.
Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implications of Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L. REV.
973, 974 (1983) (discussing separation of powers concerns in implied rights of action cases); H.
Miles Foy, Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Rights of Actions
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legislative intent in terms of colorable rights to vest § 1331
jurisdiction, with the obvious difference that in the case of treaties,
the President and the Senate wield the relevant legislative
authority. 355 Thus, vesting § 1331 cases under the more lenient
colorable right standard where both the right and the cause of action
are legislatively crafted constitutes sound policy under the unified
balancing principle's congressional intent analysis.
Constitutional cases, by contrast, present a prima facie
difficulty under this analysis. Congress did not craft the rights at
issue. Nevertheless, the taking of § 1331 jurisdiction over such cases
by way of the colorable claim standard is readily explainable in terms
of legislative intent. The Court regularly engages in a strong
presumption that Congress intends for the federal courts to hear
actions to enforce constitutional rights. 35 6 This finding of intent, when

in the State and Federal Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 524-69 (1986) (discussing the history
and implications of implied private rights of action); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67
VA. L. REV. 553, 533-54 (1981) (discussing how judicially-created implied rights of action are
precluded in some instances in which "they could play a useful and important role"); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 48-54 (1985)
(discussing implied statutory remedies).
355. See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing colorable rights created by treaties); cf. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326 Reporters Note 1 (1987)
("The Senate's understanding of a treaty to which it gives consent is binding.").
356. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (requiring a clear statement of
legislative intent to bar habeas corpus review of constitutional violations); INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 308-09 (2001) (same); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 12
(1990):
The proper inquiry is ... whether Congress has in the statute withdrawn the
Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction to the Claims Court to hear a suit involving
the statute founded upon the Constitution. Under this standard, we conclude
that the Amendments did not withdraw the Tucker Act remedy. Congress did
not exhibit the type of unambiguous intention to withdraw the Tucker Act
remedy that is necessary ....
(quotations and citations omitted); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (holding that "where
Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be
clear"); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (requiring a
heightened showing of legislative intent in part to avoid the "serious constitutional question"
that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983):
The federal courts' statutory jurisdiction to decide federal questions confers
adequate power to award damages to the victim of a constitutional violation.
When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its
intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by
the statutory remedy itself, that the Court's power should not be exercised.
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 112 (1982) ("We cannot impute to
Congress an intent now or in the future to transfer jurisdiction from constitutional to legislative
courts for the purpose of emasculating the former." (internal quotations omitted)); Johnson v.
Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974) (holding a federal statute will not be construed to preclude
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coupled with a congressionally created cause of action to enforce the
constitutional right, demonstrates sufficiently strong indicia of
legislative intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction under the colorable right
standard. Instances where the Court takes jurisdiction over an
assertion of a constitutional right that is coupled with a
constitutionally inferred cause of action may be explained in terms of
legislative intent as well. Again, the Court starts with a strong
presumption that Congress intends for these cases to be heard in
federal court. 357 Just as an assertion of a statutory right coupled with
an assertion of an inferred statutory cause of action is a sufficient
indicator of legislative intent in the statutory realm to vest § 1331, an
assertion of a constitutional right and an assertion of an inferred
cause of action constitutes a strong showing of intent to vest § 1331
jurisdiction in the constitutional realm.3 5 8 Given these strong indicia
of congressional approval to bring such cases under § 1331, application
of the more liberal colorable standard to constitutional claims is sound
under this legislative-intent model of § 1331 jurisdiction.
I turn next to the substantial rights standard. Here the Court
faces cases where state law supplies a cause of action in which a
federal right is embedded. The plaintiff in such cases is not alleging a
congressional cause of action; thus, there are fewer indicia of
congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction. Indeed, the plaintiffs
in such cases essentially concede that there is not a congressional
judgment that they are "appropriate part[ies] to invoke the power of
the [federal] courts" in the matter at hand.359 Rather, the existence of
judicial review of constitutional challenges absent clear and convincing evidence of congressional
intent).
357. See sources cited supra note 356 (discussing the Court's strong presumption that
Congress intends for the federal courts to hear actions to enforce constitutional rights).
358. See supra note 354 (discussing congressional intent to provide for implied rights of
action). Not all judges agree, however. Justice Powell, for example, considered any finding of a
cause of action by implication to be a violation of the principle of congressional control over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 747 n.17 (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting):
[W]hen a federal court implies a private action from a statute, it necessarily
expands the scope of its federal-question jurisdiction .... [Indeed w]here a
court decides both that federal-law elements are present in a state-law cause
of action, and that these elements predominate to the point that the action
can be said to present a 'federal question' cognizable in federal court, the net
effect is the same as implication of a private action directly from the
constitutional or statutory source of the federal-law elements .... [That is to
say, such an] expansive interpretation of § 1331 permits federal courts to
assume control over disputes which Congress did not consign to the federal
judicial process ....

(internal citations omitted).
359. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
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a federal right constitutes the sole marker of legislative approval to
take § 1331 jurisdiction. 360 As a result, plaintiffs in these cases must
allege a substantial federal right under the second jurisdictional
standard in order to invoke indicia of congressional intent sufficient to
361
vest § 1331 jurisdiction.
Further illustrating that legislative intent is key to this
jurisdictional analysis, federal courts in Smith-style cases must also
make particularized findings of congressional intent before taking
jurisdiction under § 1331. As the Court recently held, "the federal
issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal
jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the sound
division of labor between state and federal courts governing the
application of § 1331."362 As the explicit focus on legislative intent in
Smith-style cases demonstrates, congressional intent provides a
powerful interpretative device for explaining the Court's § 1331
jurisprudence here.
Federal common law cases present the most challenging
scenario for taking § 1331 jurisdiction on a congressional-intent
model. Claims in such cases generally lack strong indicia of
congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction because they allege
neither congressionally or constitutionally created rights nor
congressionally or constitutionally created causes of action. Moreover,
the creation of federal common law raises separation of powers and
federalism concerns, which appear to run contrary to the principles of
363
congressional control over the federal courts.
360. See supra notes 347-48 and accompanying text (discussing that the creation of rights
constitutes indicia of legislative intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction).
361. See supra Parts III.A.5.a, III.B.3 (discussing either congressionally created substantial
rights or constitutionally protected rights and state-law causes of action).
362. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313-14 (2005);
see also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8
(1983) (analyzing the statute's legislative history in order to glean congressional intent). For
thorough examples of lower courts conducting this congressional intent analysis, see Bennett v.
Sw. Airlines Co., 484 F.3d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 2007) (expressing concern that a finding of federal
jurisdiction would upset the balance struck by Congress of the division of labor between state
and federal courts in air-crash litigation); Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 553
(6th Cir. 2006) (finding that "accepting jurisdiction of this state employment action would be
disruptive of the sound division of labor between state and federal courts envisioned by
Congress").
363. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) ("Whether latent federal power
should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for Congress, not the federal
courts." (internal quotations omitted)); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L.
REV. 1259, 1273 (2001):
The Constitution's provisions setting forth the procedures for enacting
legislation impose numerous obstacles to the displacement of state law, chief
among them the bicameralism and presentment requirements. These
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Consider first the separation of powers concerns. In federal
common law cases the Court exercises legislative power, weighing any
number of policy factors-not just congressional intent-in rendering
its judgments. 364 While those who see every instance of the use of this
legislative power as a violation of Congress's exclusive legislative
authority likely rely on an oversimplified view of our constitutional
scheme, 3 65 the act of making federal common law without a statutory
directive to do so creates a particularly troubling separation of powers
issue unique to jurisdictional questions. When a federal court creates
both a right and a cause of action as a matter of federal common law,
the court is concomitantly creating § 1331 jurisdiction by creating the
requirements protect state prerogatives because the states are represented in
the legislative process. At the same time, they assure that the federal
lawmaking branches will be accountable for any federal decision to displace
state law. When the courts decide to displace state law on the basis of federal
common law, the safeguards of the bicameralism and presentment
requirements are circumvented and no political actors can easily be held
accountable for the displacement.
364. See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (holding that the weighing
of factors in the proposed creation of federal common law is more appropriately a legislative
function); Nw. Airlines, Inc., v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.41 (1981)
(same); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531-32 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
But when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine-to answer
'questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken,"-we have a special
duty to identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the proper
decision. When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the
conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental
program and the protection of the rights of the individual-whether in the
social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement
context-I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the
Congress.
(citation omitted); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)
(holding that in fashioning federal common law "[t]he range of judicial inventiveness will be
determined by the nature of the problem"); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1954)
(similar); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979-81 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2977 (2005), amended by 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (arguing that creating
a federal common law reporter's privilege is essentially a legislative task); Henry P. Monaghan,
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword:ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11
(1975) ("Thus, when a federal court announces a federal rule of decision in an area of plenary
congressional competence, it exercises an initiative normally left to Congress, ousts state law,
and yet acts without the political checks on national power created by state representation in
Congress."); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive
Process: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 766-67 (1989) (arguing that
federal common law, as it is essentially a legislative function, violates separation of powers
principles).
365. See Merrill, supra note 354, at 21 ("[Ihe notion that Congress is the exclusive federal
lawmaking body is an oversimplification of constitutional reality-not only the reality of today,
in which administrative agencies churn out reams of edicts having the force of law, but also the
reality presented by the Constitution itself."); id. at 13-19 (describing the federalism limitations
on federal common law).
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very analytical components required to vest jurisdiction under the
statute. 366 But by all standard accounts, the Constitution places the
power to "expand the jurisdiction of [the lower federal] courts...
36 7
specifically ... in the Congress, not in the courts."
Pure federal common law suits raise substantial federalism
concerns as well. 368 Federal common law rights typically 369 preempt
state law in some fashion.3 70 The Court consistently holds that

366. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972) (finding a federal common law
claim constitutes "a question arising under the laws of the United States"); Tidmarsh & Murray,
supra note 262, at 653 (arguing that "a federal common law claim creates federal jurisdiction");
cf. Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L. J. 1001, 1035 (2006) (arguing, in regard to
equal protection claims, that recognizing certain "actionable federal constitutional claims would
dramatically expand the jurisdiction of federal courts"). Congress retains broad control of the
jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of subject matter
jurisdiction than is found in Article III. See supra note 335 (discussing how Congress retains
power to vest the lower federal courts with as much or as little of the federal jurisdiction that is
granted by Article III).
367. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1969); see also Empire Healthchoice Assurance,
Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 696 (2006) ("We have no warrant to expand Congress'
jurisdictional grant 'by judicial decree.' "); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994) ("Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." (citations
omitted)). By most accounts, Congress retains broad control of the jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts, and it may grant a narrower scope of subject matter jurisdiction than is found in
Article III. See supra notes 11, 335.
368. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 338, at 1412-19 (arguing that the limitations on federal
common law reflect the idea that "the Constitution ...constrains the manner in which the
federal government may exercise [its delegated] powers to displace state law").
369. Federal common law at times may be made for the purpose of giving effect to a federal
statute when there is no otherwise applicable state law that is displaced. See, e.g., Textile
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957) (finding that the TaftHartley Act gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear controversies involving labor contracts and
authorized federal courts to make a body of federal law for enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements). Or at times federal common law may explicitly adopt the law of the state as the
federal rule, displacing state law only in a nominal sense. See, e.g., Kamen v. Kemper Fin.
Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1991) (applying the law of the state of incorporation to a
derivative action brought under the Investment Company Act). Another instance lies in the
federal common law of Indian relations. In the case of Indian law, the field is so dominated by
federal law there is no state law to displace. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-53 (1985) (discussing the plenary power of the federal
government over Indian tribes).
370. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (holding that because federal
common law displaces state law, such issues properly are matters of congressional concern);
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83 (1994) (rejecting federal common law rule for
attorney malpractice, inter alia, as it would "divesto States of authority over the entire law of
imputation"); see also Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (finding that "a few
areas, involving 'uniquely federal interests,' are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the
United states to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by
federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called
'federal common law'" (citation omitted)); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726
(1979) ("This Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions involving the rights
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Congress is the better institution to make these preemption
judgments than are the federal courts.3 7 1 This institutional advantage
flows from the fact that the states are represented there, 372 the actors
involved are politically accountable, 373 and the process for passing
federal statutes offers several opportunities for the states to give
37 4
input.
A full-blown determination of whether the legislative flavor of
federal common law is constitutionally illegitimate 375 or a necessary
element of our constitutional scheme 376 is beyond the scope of this
jurisdictional discussion. But given these weighty separation of
powers and federalism concerns, even if one believes that the practice
of making federal common law is a necessary component of our system
of government, it surely follows that the Court should exercise its
"traditional reluctance... to expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional statutes" 377 with a
special vigor in this domain. It is not surprising, then, that the Court
is stingier in finding § 1331 jurisdiction in pure federal common law

of the United States arising under nationwide federal programs."); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964) ("We conclude that the scope of the act of state doctrine
must be determined according to federal law."); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer
Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 494-95 (2007) (finding that
"constitutional preemption is a component of almost all the federal common law decisions that
displace state law with a judicially created alternative"); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 262, at
615 ("Federal common law displaces state law, and thus shifts the balance of power from state to
federal government.").
371. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (finding that because the
states are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts, the presumption against
displacement of state law is consistent with a presumption in favor of displacement of federal
common law); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (holding that "whether
latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is primarily a decision for
Congress," not the federal courts).
372. See supra note 338 (discussing process federalism and how states' interests are
protected in Congress).
373. Vazquez, supranote 363.
374. Id.
375. See Redish, supra note 364 (arguing that federal common law, as it is essentially a
legislative function, violates separation of powers principles).
376. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the
recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory codes, and is apparent from the terms of
the Constitution itself."); Merrill, supra note 354, at 21 (discussing how the Court will exercise
legislative power at times due to our complex constitutional scheme); Monaghan, supra note 364,
at 14 ("[Ihe authority to create federal common law springs of necessity from the structure of
the Constitution, from its basic division of authority between the national government and the
states.").
377. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959).
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cases,
employing
the
substantial-right-plus-sufficient-showing
378
standard.
This is not to say that a congressional intent justification for
the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction over federal common law cases is
entirely lacking. Indeed, statutory federal common law, such as
rulings under the Sherman Act, is crafted pursuant to explicit
congressional commands.3 7 9 As a result, these cases do not face the
same separation of powers and federalism concerns that pure federal
common law cases do. 38 0 Because these statutorily directed federal
common law cases demonstrate stronger indicia of congressional
intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, it makes sense, from a
congressional-intent perspective, that the Court apply the more
lenient colorable right standard in such cases. 38 1 The Court takes a
similar approach in federal common law of Indian relations cases, in
part, because there are no federalism concerns lurking in such
cases.

382

378. See supraPart III.C (discussing pure federal common law rights).
379. See supra note 267-69 and accompanying text (describing the first category of statutory
federal common law, in which the federal courts create federal common law in response to a
statutory directive).
380. See, e.g., Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 958
(1996):
When a federal court acts unilaterally to "displace" governing state law,... it
runs headlong into substantial federalism and separation of powers
objections. These same concerns, however, do not arise when federal law
governs by congressional direction that calls upon the federal courts to fill in
the contours of federal law in accordance with congressionally adopted policy.
see also Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("Congress,
however, did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute
or its application in concrete situations. The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it
expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition.").
381. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981) (holding
that there is no federal common law right to contribution among fellow unlawful conspirators in
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act and affirming dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds).
382. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 850-53 (1985)
(specifically invoking the Holmes test and holding that Indian law is so predominated by federal
policy that state law is never applicable); Oneida Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661,
675-77 (1974). In Oneida Indian Nation, the Court straddled the fence between the colorable
and substantial assertion of a right standards:
Enough has been said, we think, to indicate that the complaint in this case
asserts a present right to possession under federal law. The claim may fail at
a later stage for a variety of reasons; but for jurisdictional purposes, this is
not a case where the underlying right or obligation arises only under state
law and federal law is merely alleged as a barrier to its effectuation ....[W]e
think the complaint before us satisfies the additional requirement formulated
in some cases that the complaint reveal a "dispute or controversy respecting
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By contrast, a congressional-intent justification to vest § 1331
jurisdiction over pure federal common law cases is more attenuated.
Perhaps the best argument for the justification is that the
Constitution requires some limited form of federal common law 38 3 and
38 4
congressional intent to comport with the Constitution is presumed.
Given this less weighty legislative intent justification for vesting
§ 1331, it follows from a congressional intent perspective that the
Court should apply a more stringent jurisdictional standard to pure
federal common law cases.
Thus, the unified balancing principle explains the Court's
disparate § 1331 jurisdictional standards in a rational manner and, in
so doing, provides a strong retort to the assumptions of the
predominant view. Indeed, this approach provides a means of
employing legislative intent as the driving force for the vesting of
§ 1331 jurisdiction, contrary to the dictates of the predominant
view. 38 5 Similarly, the unified balancing principle offers a means of
reconciling the Court's competing vesting standards under one
principle-congressional intent-again contrary to the predominant
view.

386

This approach assumes, of course, that the Court actually
engages in some interpretive exercise designed to ascertain legislative
intent when it takes § 1331 jurisdiction.3 8 7 Professor Friedman,
however, persuasively argues that the Court's § 1331 jurisprudence
has not been focused on congressional intent pursuant to traditional
statutory construction rules. 388 I have attempted, however, to find
legislative intent not pursuant to traditional rules of statutory

the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of
which the result depends."
414 U.S. at 675-77.
383. See supra note 376 for sources advocating that the legislative aspect of federal common
law is a necessary element of our constitutional scheme.
384. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 (1994) ("[Wle do not
impute to Congress an intent to pass legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution.");
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) ("[W]e should not assume that Congress chose to
disregard a constitutional danger zone so clearly marked.").
385. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing the predominant view that
§ 1331 jurisdiction doctrine lacks a focus upon legislative intent).
386. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing the predominant view that
§ 1331 jurisdiction doctrine is fundamentally inconsistent).
387. See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective in a case such
as this [a statutory construction case] is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to
the legislative will.").
388. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 24 ("Congress's intent [in enacting § 1331] has had
little or nothing to do with the Court's decisions concerning what constitutes a federal
question.").
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construction. Professor Friedman is assuredly correct that the Court
has not engaged in this traditional statutory construction project
when it comes to § 1331. Instead, I have argued that the key to
bringing legislative intent, and added clarity, back into the § 1331
analysis is to seek intent in the creation of federal rights and causes of
action.
My claim that the unified balancing principle provides a
mechanism to give more weight to legislative intent in § 1331 analyses
is not all-encompassing either. I do not contend that every aspect of
§ 1331 doctrine is reducible to legislative intent. The well-pleaded
complaint rule, for example, does not seem amenable to such a
reinterpretation. 38 9 The more modest claim made here is that
legislative intent, as evidenced by way of federal rights and causes of
action, offers an explanatory thesis that reconciles the Court's
apparently disparate tests for satisfying the well-pleaded complaint
rule. One might also object that this reinterpretation strays too far
from the process in which the Court was actually engaged in when
these many federal question jurisdiction cases were decided. This may
be true. But given the increased coherence and focus upon legislative
intent that this view fosters, acting as if the Court's decisions were
aiming at congressional intent would, in Plato's words, constitute a
"noble falsehood." 390
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I contend that the unified balancing principle
can bring much-needed clarity to the Court's § 1331 jurisprudence.
According to this view, § 1331 jurisdiction is best understood as a
function of the viability of the federal right a plaintiff asserts in
relation to other indicia of congressional permission to bring such a
claim in federal court, which is often expressed by the creation of
causes of action. This perspective offers a heretofore abandoned focus
upon congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, a means of
reconciling apparently disparate § 1331 holdings, and greater clarity
for adjudicating tough cases.

389. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38

HASTINGS L.J. 597, 601-07 (1987) (arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule does not
comport with the intent of the 1875 Congress that originally passed § 1331).
390. PLATO, REPUBLIC 91 (C.D.C. Reeve ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publishing Co.
1992) (arguing that it would be noble to tell the true guardians of the republic a lie, namely, that
they contain gold in their soul and thus have no need for material wealth).
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To this end, the unified balancing principle underlies three
standards into which the Court's § 1331 cases may be characterized.
Under the first standard, § 1331 jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff
makes an assertion of a congressionally or constitutionally created
cause of action and a colorable assertion of a federal right. Under the
second standard, § 1331 lies when a plaintiff alleges a state-law cause
of action and asserts a substantial federal right. Finally, under the
third standard, § 1331 jurisdiction lies when a plaintiff asserts a
federal cause of action created as a matter of federal common law and
the plaintiff asserts a substantial federal common law right coupled
with sufficient factual allegations to support the right. Of course, the
unified balancing principle is not a panacea for all that ails federal
question doctrine. But I contend that the replacement of inaccurate
stock methods, such as the Holmes test, with a focus upon legislative
intent and these three standards would be a boon for both courts and
litigants who must grapple with tough questions of § 1331 jurisdiction.

An Empirical Investigation into
Appellate Structure and the
Perceived Quality of
Appellate Review
61 Vand. L. Rev. 1745 (2008)
JonathanRemy Nash
Rafael I. Pardo
Commentators have theorized that several factors may
improve the process, and thus perhaps the accuracy, of appellate
review: (1) review by a panel of judges, (2) subject-matter expertise in
the area of the appeal, (3) other lawfinding ability, (4) adherence to
traditional notions of appellate hierarchy, and (5) the judicial
independence of appellatejudges. The considerable discussion that
has expounded upon these theories has occurred in a vacuum of
abstract generalization. This Article adds a new dimension by
presenting the results of an empirical study of bankruptcy appellate
opinions issued over a three-year period. The federal bankruptcy
appellate structureprovides certain litigants the choice to appeal, in
the first instance, to one of two distinct appellate tribunals-district
courts and bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs)-whose structural
features differ with respect to the theorized qualities of appellate
review. As BAPs appear to have more of the features identified as
improving the quality of appellate review, the study tests the theory
through various hypotheses that focus on the perception held by
other federal courts within the bankruptcy appellate structure of the
quality of appellate review provided by these distinct appellate
tribunals. The data show that, as measured by (1) circuit court
affirmance rates and (2) the citationpractices of other federal courts
to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district courts, BAPs
have been perceived to provide a better quality of appellate review.
Having unearthed some evidence that supports the theoretical
notions underlying the quality of appellate review, this Article
concludes that commentators and policymakers ought to be
encouraged to explore further, in a more detailed manner, the
question of how appellate structure can be designed to produce better
results.
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